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AN EX ANTE APPROACH TO
EXCESSIVE STATE DEBT
VINCENT S.J. BUCCOLA†
ABSTRACT
The recent recession has shone a very public spotlight on the
perilous financial conditions of many American states. At the same
time, it has renewed academic interest in the question of excessive state
debt—its causes and possible cures. Scholars who see risk
externalization as a primary driver of systematic overborrowing have
proposed bankruptcy legislation for the states as one solution. Such
advocates argue that a formal debt-adjustment mechanism could
reduce the appeal of federal bailouts and thereby curtail the moral
hazard leading to excessive debt. But given the states’ unilateral power
to set the terms of default, it is hard to see why an opportunistic state
would be inclined voluntarily to invoke an ex post debt-adjustment
mechanism—and indeed this Article shows that even under existing
law states could effectively opt into the federal bankruptcy procedures
of Chapter 9 if they so desired. An ex ante approach is needed.
This Article identifies one such ex ante approach, “tax-credit
borrowing,” and argues that with minimal changes to federal tax
policy, this approach could reduce risk externalization more
effectively than bankruptcy legislation can. The advantage of taxcredit borrowing in this context stems from its capacity to preclude
default by toggling the plaintiff/defendant distinction that lies at the
heart of modern sovereign-immunity doctrine. Without a credible
threat of default, a state’s leverage in bailout negotiations and the
concomitant moral hazard would be greatly reduced. But tax-credit
borrowing would have important implications for state fiscal policy
even if agency problems (rather than risk externalization) better
explain state borrowing habits. This Article shows how the availability
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of risk-free debt could reduce borrowing costs and improve the
monitoring of state political actors.
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INTRODUCTION
1

2

Detroit’s 2013 petition for Chapter 9 bankruptcy relief can be
read as the coda to a dramatic yet idiosyncratic tale of economic
decline. Challenges from abroad to the domestic automotive industry,
rapid depopulation, and questionable leadership tell a remarkable
and discomforting story. But in many respects the financial problems
Detroit faces today are similar to, if currently more pronounced than,
the troubles confronting many towns and cities across the country.
The economic slump following the 2008 housing-market implosion
exposed the precarious financial position of many American states
too. Declining real-property values and employment levels combined
to erode the tax base. At the same time, spending obligations
attached to countercyclical welfare programs, such as Medicaid,
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946 (2012).
2. Declaration of Kevyn D. Orr in Support of City of Detroit, Michigan’s Statement of
Qualifications Pursuant to Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, In re City of Detroit, 498
B.R. 776 (Bankr. E.D. Mich., filed July 18, 2013) (No. 2:13-bk-53846).
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3

strained what revenue states could raise. The net result has been to
underline these states’ massive debt obligations, particularly bond
and retirement-benefit obligations. Credit-rating agencies have
repeatedly downgraded the general-obligation ratings of the most
troubled states, including California, Illinois, Michigan, and New
4
Jersey. And commentators have begun to worry about the first wave
5
of state defaults since the 1890s.
Signs of a reviving national economy could lessen some concerns.
In June of 2013, for example, the California legislature surprised
6
observers with its first budget surplus in years. Yet the picture is far
from sanguine. Public-employee pension funds have been chronically
underfunded. Thus, for example, California achieved its “surplus” by
7
underfunding its teachers’ pensions to the tune of $4.5 billion.
Experts calculate that pension trust funds in some states, notably
8
Illinois, will be exhausted within the decade. The most troubled
states are at best out of the frying pan.
Responding to this predicament, a number of academics and
political figures have urged Congress to permit states to restructure or
otherwise shed debt through a formal, federal bankruptcy process
modeled on Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. A series of op-eds

3. Adam J. Levitin, Fiscal Federalism and the Limits of Bankruptcy, in WHEN STATES GO
BROKE 214, 216–19 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012); Damon A. Silvers,
Obligations Without the Power to Fund Them, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra, at 40, 45–50.
4. See, e.g., Pamela M. Prah, Adam Rotmil & Stephen C. Fehr, Infographic: S&P State
Credit Ratings, 2001–2014, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (June 9, 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/
en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/06/09/sp-ratings-2014.
5. Arkansas defaulted on its bond obligations in 1933, the only state to have defaulted
since the beginning of the twentieth century. For representative concerns over state default, see,
for example, Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Mounting Debts by States Stoke Fears of
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, at A1 (reporting financial analysts’ fear that “because many
state and local governments have so much debt—several trillion dollars’ worth, with much of it
off the books and largely hidden from view”—their debt “could overwhelm them in the next
few years”); Mark Muro, Will States Default on Their Debt?, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 18, 2011),
http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/the-avenue/81688/will-states-default-their-debt (“Look for
the unprecedented times and the forced end of business-as-usual, with radical restructurings
absolutely necessary.”).
6. Jim Christie, California Governor and Lawmakers Strike Budget Deal, REUTERS (June
10, 2013, 9:07 PM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/11/us-california-budgetidUSBRE95A01N20130611.
7. David Henderson, California’s Phony Budget Surplus, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY (June
1, 2013), http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2013/06/californias_pho.html.
8. Olivia S. Mitchell, Public Pension Pressures in the United States, in WHEN STATES GO
BROKE, supra note 3, at 67.
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has made the case in the popular press. Meanwhile law reviews have
witnessed the growth of what one commentator dubs a “cottage
industry” devoted to debating the merits and design of a state10
bankruptcy regime.
The state-bankruptcy proposals have an intuitively surprising
ambition. Since the pioneering work of Professors Douglas Baird and
Thomas Jackson in the 1980s, economically minded scholars have
generally understood bankruptcy as a corrective to the familiar
collective-action problems attending individual and corporate
financial distress—the so-called common-pool and debt-overhang
11
problems. These dynamics are at best attenuated in the public
9. Jeb Bush & Newt Gingrich, Op-Ed., Better Off Bankrupt: States Should Have the
Option of Bankruptcy Protection to Deal with Their Budget Crises, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/jan/27/opinion/la-oe-gingrich-bankruptcy-20110127
(“Federal bailouts must come to an end. Federal taxpayers in states that balance their budgets
should not have to bail out the irresponsible, pandering politicians who cannot balance their
budgets. Congress must allow a safe, orderly way under federal bankruptcy law for states to
reorganize their finances.”); Grover G. Norquist & Patrick Gleason, Let States Go Bankrupt,
POLITICO (Dec. 24, 2010, 8:52 AM, updated Dec. 24, 2010, 9:48 AM), http://www.politico
.com/news/stories/1210/46777.html (“[F]ederal legislation allowing states to file bankruptcy
might be the only way to avoid a federal bailout of the most fiscally reckless states in the
union.”). These pieces borrowed from David Skeel’s op-ed. proposals. See David Skeel, Op-Ed.,
A Bankruptcy Law—Not Bailouts—for the States, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011, http://online.wsj
.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703779704576073522930513118 [hereinafter Skeel, A
Bankruptcy Law]; David Skeel, Give Bankruptcy a Chance, WEEKLY STANDARD (June 29,
2009),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/658hmvhc.asp
[hereinafter Skeel, Give Bankruptcy]; David Skeel, Give States a Way to Go Bankrupt, WEEKLY
STANDARD (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/give-states-way-gobankrupt_518378.html [hereinafter Skeel, Give States].
10. Clayton P. Gillette, Commentary, Bankruptcy and Its By-Products: A Comment on
Skeel, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2013) [hereinafter Gillette, Bankruptcy By-Products].
Representative pieces include Anna Gelpern, Commentary, A Skeptic’s Case for Sovereign
Bankruptcy, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1095 (2013); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will,
and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2012) [hereinafter Gillette,
Fiscal Federalism]; Richard M. Hynes, State Default and Synthetic Bankruptcy, 87 WASH. L.
REV. 657 (2012); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011); Stephen L.
Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy”, 59 UCLA L. REV. 322 (2011); David
A. Skeel, Jr., Address, Is Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities and States?, 50 HOUS. L.
REV. 1063 (2013) [hereinafter Skeel, Is Bankruptcy]; David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy,
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677 (2012) [hereinafter Skeel, States of Bankruptcy].
11. A common pool refers to a situation where it is in the best interest of each participant,
acting alone, to maximize use of a shared asset, even where doing so would reduce the asset’s
aggregate value. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW 10–19 (1986); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J.
LEGAL STUD. 127, 132–33 (1986); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy
Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 864–65 (1982). Debt overhang occurs
when existing debt deters new investment because the benefits from new investment will go to
existing debtors rather than to new investors. Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr.,
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context, however, in which creditor remedies are closely
12
circumscribed and where states can raise capital by fiat. Rather,
proponents of state bankruptcy take aim at what they see as a moral
13
hazard associated with the possibility of a federal bailout.
On this theory, adhered to even by many skeptics of state14
bankruptcy legislation, states may systematically overborrow secure
in the knowledge that if things get dire enough the national
government will come to their rescue. Spillover costs and the risk of
contagion associated with a major default all but guarantee assistance;
the federal government cannot credibly promise not to intervene.
Moral hazard in this context arises not from explicit insurance, but
from an expectation that the state will be viewed as “too big to fail.”
If the federal apparatus must prop up (apparently) overleveraged
banks and insurers, why not overleveraged states? Such, anyway, was
15
Warren Buffett’s reasoning in an interview laying out this view. To
the extent a state’s default could infect the broader economy,
strategic state actors would likely act as though the federal
government were the state’s insurer.
The proponents of a state-bankruptcy regime seek to relieve this
dynamic. If states enjoyed a forum, endowed with the majesty of law,
in which creditors could be forced to take a haircut in the name of
solvency and stability, then perhaps at least the pathetic argument for
bailout could be resisted. As one commentator put it, “The appeal of

Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 474 (2010); see generally Stewart C. Myers, The
Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977) (explaining how the existence
of corporate debt can weaken the corporation’s incentive to undertake good future
investments).
12. Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121
YALE L.J. 888, 910 (2012); Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 10, at 295; Michael W.
McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal
Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 429 (1993).
13. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 324. Moral hazard refers to the propensity of an
insured actor to take on supraoptimal risk because the insurer will bear some or all of the costs
of the risk’s materializing.
14. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 10, at 312–13 (“Bailouts create moral hazard
and impede efforts to impose fiscal discipline on localities. Bailouts violate the underpinnings of
fiscal federalism by imposing on nonresidents the costs of decisions made solely by local
officials.”); Gelpern, supra note 10, at 1113.
15. Jamie McGee & Darrell Preston, Buffett Says GM Rescue May Mean U.S. Can’t Say No
to States, BLOOMBERG (May 5, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0505/buffett-says-gm-rescue-may-mean-u-s-can-t-say-no-to-states-facing-default.html.
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bankruptcy-for-states is that it would give the federal government a
16
compelling reason to resist the bailout urge.”
Capitol Hill has evidently scotched state-bankruptcy legislation
17
for the time being. Perhaps, one might think, we will never know
about the merits of a “Chapter 9 for states.” Yet a fatalistic attitude
on this score is unjustified. Although under existing law states are
18
formally ineligible for bankruptcy relief, in practical terms they
could, with some creative structuring, make their finances eligible for
adjustment in Chapter 9. States could leverage the Bankruptcy
Code’s capacious definition of “municipality,” which is broad enough
to encompass an instrumentality chartered for the sole purpose of
19
issuing debt.
That states have not made themselves eligible for bankruptcy in
this way indicates foundational problems with arguments that a statebankruptcy regime would alleviate bailout incentives and thus moral
hazard. Indeed, state-bankruptcy skeptics have identified these
problems as challenges to hypothetical legislation. First, sovereign
immunity implies that states do not need federal authorization to
adjust debts, which they can effectively discharge or reduce through
20
21
default. Second, the moral-hazard theory itself suggests that
strategic state actors will not voluntarily cede the power to externalize
risk, a power that maximizes the joint surplus of the state and its
creditors. One is tempted to conclude that voluntary, ex post
correctives to state moral hazard are doomed for these reasons.
This Article identifies an ex ante financing mechanism that could
more effectively reduce the moral hazard associated with too-big-tofail thinking. Specifically, this Article suggests that widespread use of
“tax-credit borrowing” (in place of traditional forms of state debt)
could decrease the prospect of state defaults. State debt typically
constitutes a promise that the treasury will pay a specified sum at a
specified future date. This Article proposes recharacterizing some or
all of these obligations, be they to a state’s lenders, vendors, or
employees. Instead of promising a cash outlay, the state would
16. Skeel, Give States, supra note 9.
17. Nicole Bullock, Lawmakers Resist Bankruptcy for US States, CNBC (Feb. 15, 2011, 6:45
AM), www.cnbc.com/id/41595577.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
19. See infra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.
20. See Hynes, supra note 10, at 676–79; Jonathan Rodden, Market Discipline and U.S.
Federalism, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra note 3, at 123, 131–32.
21. See Rodden, supra note 20, at 124.
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promise to allow the holder of a debt instrument to offset her taxes by
the amount owed. The state’s coffers would feel no effect—one more
22
dollar payable is the same as one less dollar receivable.
The difference is not financial but legal, trading on the
plaintiff/defendant distinction at the heart of modern sovereignimmunity doctrine. States can default on traditional debt because
creditors lack a remedy. A state wishing to repudiate a vested tax
credit, however, can do so only by collecting the taxes at issue. This
would require the state, rather than the creditors, to invoke judicial
process. As a plaintiff, the state would be unable to invoke sovereign
immunity; its creditors would be free to defend the tax-underpayment
action by invoking the Constitution’s Contract Clause. If the threat of
default can give states the whip hand in negotiations with the federal
government, then tax-credit borrowing could eliminate the moral
hazard by curtailing default.
At the outset, I must confess agnosticism about the empirical
significance of the moral hazard that state-bankruptcy proponents
identify. Their theory is sound enough, to be sure. Risk
externalization—the tendency to shift the costs associated with
uncertain, bad outcomes—has preoccupied many would-be reformers
of corporate, banking, and insurance law, to name only a few subjects.
Plainly it is a plausible concern. And in looking at recent bailouts
around the world, from AIG to Greece, it is hard (for the cynical
among us, anyway) not to detect the sure whiff of gamesmanship.
Yet thoughtful observers are not unanimous on this question,
23
one that seems to elude objective measurement. Some have argued

22. This is mathematically true, but its truth does not necessarily imply that relevant
players in the markets and at the polls will think it so. A large and growing literature on tax
salience suggests that in some circumstances financially identical obligations are widely thought
to bear divergent costs. For an introduction to the literature, see generally David Gamage &
Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L.
REV. 19 (2011). That said, there are good reasons to think the financial identity of traditional
and tax-credit-borrowing arrangements would be clear. First, prices in a competitive market are
set by the marginal rather than inframarginal participants. As long as the marginal potential
lender sees that a dollar is a dollar, yields will equilibrate except to the extent risk properties
differ. Second, the two forms of borrowing are the same with respect to timing and the
immediate incidence of the financial burden on the state treasury. To illustrate the intuition,
imagine that a charitably minded person wishes to subsidize a shopper’s grocery bill. The donor
stands at the checkout line and presents the shopper with a choice: he can either have a onedollar note before paying the cashier, or the donor can pay the cashier directly, reducing the
shopper’s bill by the same amount. It is hard to imagine the shopper caring; indeed, he would
likely find the choice puzzling.
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that constitutional taxing and debt restrictions, rather than a coherent
externalization strategy, are to blame for the states’ current
24
problems. Others posit more generally that subnational governments
are simply unresponsive to the subtler incentives of federal fiscal
25
policy. Moreover, any externalization incentive within a jurisdiction
is bound to meet opposition from within as well as outside state lines.
When financial distress appears on the horizon, creditor coalitions
will inevitably exert what influence they can to assure a policy of debt
repayment: A federal bailout is never certain and is in any event
unlikely to make creditors whole. How this political dynamic plays
out in any given case will turn on particulars still obscure after three
centuries of political economy. This Article aims not to enter a publicchoice debate, but only to note that the extent of states’ apparent
moral hazard is in doubt (if indeed it makes any sense in this context
to speak of the state as a unified whole).
The risk-externalization theory of excessive state debt calls for a
straightforward and normatively attractive application of tax-credit
borrowing. The question this Article poses (and begins to answer) is,
however, more general: what might tax-credit borrowing look like in
a world where states are inclined to overborrow? What follows should
therefore interest even readers who think state borrowing practices
have little to do with risk externalization. For example, the principal
competing theories of excessive state debt stem from a standard
agency problem: politicians overborrow because they are not
effectively monitored. They favor spending on projects for which they
can take credit or gain favors, and they are inclined to push costs to
the future, long after they leave office. On this view the people
affected by a state’s long-term financial prospects do a poor job of
reining in borrowing. They reward near-term spending and tax-relief
initiatives at the expense of future solvency; they are draped in fiscal
illusion. Here again the introduction of tax-credit borrowing could
have significant consequences for fiscal policy. Certainty of
repayment means cheaper debt in the first instance. But such
certainty also reduces the incentive to monitor—rather, it shifts the
monitoring incentive because it shifts the incidence of financial risk
23. For a discussion of how tax-credit borrowing could shed light on the empirical
significance of risk externalization, see infra Part II.A.
24. Levitin, supra note 3, at 218; Silvers, supra note 3, at 50–52.
25. Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and Financially Stressed Municipalities, 39 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 639, 677 (2012); Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 866
(2012).
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from creditors to taxpayers and residents. Whether tax-credit
borrowing could be a tool for good or ill is thus a question of political
economy on which this Article seeks to shed light.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the law
governing traditional state borrowing practices and explains why
states have difficulty creating risk-free or otherwise superpriority debt
obligations. It then introduces tax-credit borrowing as a solution to
that particular problem of public finance. Parts II through IV
consider applications of tax-credit borrowing to the problem of
excessive state debt. Part II defines the problem and gives
background on the leading explanations. Part III takes up the riskexternalization theory, describing the state-bankruptcy debate and
arguing that tax-credit borrowing can better cure moral hazard than
debt-adjustment legislation. Part IV discusses how tax-credit
borrowing could mitigate agency problems often thought to cause
excessive debt.
I. THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF TAX-CREDIT BORROWING
This Article’s most modest ambition is to identify a solution to a
seemingly intractable problem in public finance: states’ inability to
issue debt credibly stratified by priority of payment obligation. More
specifically, it seeks to identify a mechanism by which states could
borrow against risk-free debt obligations.
Prioritized debt structures are ubiquitous in the private sphere.
In the business context, for example, a firm wishing to raise cash for
current expenditures may simultaneously (or, more typically,
iteratively) borrow from some lenders on a secured basis and from
26
others with unsecured bonds or notes. The debtor firm’s repayment
obligation is owed equally to secured and unsecured creditors, but the
secured creditor faces less risk of impairment and therefore charges a
lower interest rate. State law permits the secured creditor to foreclose
on and sell mortgaged property to satisfy its debt without respect to
the effect foreclosure may have on unsecured or otherwise junior

26. Borrowers are of course not limited to the secured/unsecured dichotomy. Second-lien
secured debt and subordinated unsecured debt are staples of corporate finance. Individuals
have the same opportunity. A consumer debtor may, for example, use the title to her Porsche as
collateral for a secured loan and at the same time borrow on an unsecured basis by swiping her
credit card.
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creditors. In the event of a bankruptcy filing, the absolute-priority
rule ensures that secured claims be paid in full before junior interests
28
receive anything from the estate.
Even the most senior creditor of a business firm faces risk, of
course. The collateral may lose value to such a degree that the
creditor is impaired notwithstanding her repossession or foreclosure
rights. But standard covenants can reduce the risk to something
approaching zero. Secured loans often decree a default—and thus
accelerate repayment obligations and remedies for nonpayment—if,
for example, the debtor’s debt-to-assets ratio falls below a specified
threshold. The more conservative the ratio, the safer and cheaper the
debt is.
Prioritizing obligations can allow a debtor to reduce total
29
borrowing costs. Yet the remedial law applicable to states prevents
them from issuing traditional superpriority debt broadly. The states’
immunity from enforcement suits impairs their ability to make
credible commitments at all—let alone priority commitments. In
other words, in addition to paying for the time-value of money and
for the risk that assets will be insufficient to cover debt, a state
borrower must compensate lenders for the political risk that the state
will choose to default and reject a judicial remedy. Thus, in the
sovereign context, the issuance of priority obligations affords little or
no reduction in borrowing costs (unless backed by collateral that a
creditor could practically seize). This Part describes the remedial
problem and then introduces the concept of tax-credit borrowing as a
commitment device that can create superpriority, risk-free debt.

27. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs repossession of moveable assets.
See U.C.C. § 9-601, 9-608–10 (2010). The law of foreclosure on real property varies by
jurisdiction, but it is an available remedy in every state.
28. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2070–71
(2012) (analyzing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(a)); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N.
LaSalle St. P’Ship, 526 U.S. 434, 444–49 (1999) (interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)); Case v. L.A.
Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 114–16 (1939) (stating that secured creditors come before
unsecured creditors in reorganization law).
29. Why exactly this is so remains a longstanding puzzle. See generally Franco Modigliani
& Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48
AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958) (showing that under certain assumptions, investors should be
indifferent to the capital structure of a firm). The answer may lie in the diversity of lenders’ risk
preferences. It may also be a function of variable monitoring costs. See Saul Levmore, Monitors
and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 50–59 (1982) (arguing
that economies in the monitoring of debtor behavior may explain secured lending).
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A. Remedial Law as an Obstacle to Priority Borrowing
The states’ inability to prioritize debt is a function in the first
instance of sovereign immunity. Creditors have long found their
attempts to secure payments from the states frustrated in federal
30
31
court. In the well-known 1890 case of Hans v. Louisiana, itself an
action seeking payment on a state bond, the Supreme Court
interpreted the Eleventh Amendment, and the principles of
sovereignty underlying it, to block federal-question jurisdiction over
32
suits against the states by their own citizens. Although Ex parte
33
Young soon put sovereign immunity’s longevity, or at least its scope,
34
in doubt, the modern Court has consistently held that sovereign
immunity bars federal actions seeking money damages from a state’s
35
treasury. The picture for creditors is almost as bleak in the state
36
judiciaries. Alden v. Maine prevents Congress from subjecting
nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in the states’ own
37
courts. The states are thus free simply to deny creditors a forum for
recovery, and some version of immunity is the norm in every state.
One study reports that today forty of the fifty states bar moneydamages suits in their own courts, and none consents to damages
38
actions in federal court. Nor can creditors of those states that do
allow damages actions rest easy. Legislatures remain free to strip the
39
courts of jurisdiction in anticipation of a default. And enforcement
40
of a judgment could present its own difficulties.
In short, state creditors lack coercive power to enforce a debt
owed. They are at the mercy of state fiscal expediency. In practical
terms this means that state politicians may legislate debt adjustments
as they see fit. Suppose a financially strapped state wished to pay only
30. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667–74 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 49–52 (1944).
31. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
32. Id. at 20–21.
33. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
34. Id. at 149–52.
35. See, e.g., Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1639 (2011);
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667–74. For an extensive treatment of sovereign immunity’s doctrinal
development, see generally JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1991).
36. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
37. Id. at 755–56.
38. Gelpern, supra note 12, at 901.
39. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 750–51.
40. Gelpern, supra note 12, at 900.
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seventy-five cents on the dollar for a series of bonds due next year.
This might be accomplished by reducing the bonds’ principal,
extending their maturity, or reducing their interest rate. To
accomplish this, the state legislature could declare its intention to
default and permit holders to exchange the now-worthless paper for
41
new, amended bonds. Alternatively, the state could decline to pay a
class of debt outright. In this way the state can unilaterally adjust its
debts without creditor consent or any kind of federal imprimatur.
What of state constitutional provisions making certain classes of
debt sacrosanct? Many constitutions provide that debts are backed by
42
the state’s “full faith and credit.” Could this kind of guarantee
invalidate legislation aimed at strategic default? It is possible that a
governor opposed to default could cite constitutional language of this
sort to justify a decision to buck legislative will. To the extent such a
governor thought the legislature’s repudiation ultra vires, he could
perhaps pay the state’s debts in defiance of legislative repudiation.
43
But this kind of move would be of doubtful validity —and probably
unpopular in a repudiating state. Certainly, given the protections of
sovereign immunity, it is hard to see how a constitutional right to
payment could help creditors in the courts.
In addition to blocking creditor remedies using sovereign
immunity, states might also be able to restructure their debt
obligations unilaterally by attacking the substantive debts themselves.
This might be accomplished through a composition statute setting the

41. This is not merely a theoretical possibility. In the period following Reconstruction, a
number of southern states repudiated bond obligations. At times, their strategy was to declare
outstanding instruments invalid, but permit holders to redeem them in exchange for newly
issued securities granting less attractive terms. In 1874, for example, Louisiana had bonds
outstanding with a face value of $18,000,000. John Norton Pomeroy, The Supreme Court and
State Repudiation—The Virginia and Louisiana Cases, 17 AM. L. REV. 684, 699 (1883).
Legislators declared that the debts were fraudulent and that the state would not pay. Id. In a
sort of “compromise,” the legislature enacted a law permitting bondholders to exchange their
instruments for new “consolidation” bonds worth 60 percent of the outstanding bonds’ nominal
value. Id. at 700. More than two-thirds of creditors tendered their bonds. Id. To their chagrin,
Louisiana ultimately defaulted on its obligations under the consolidation bonds. Id.
42. E.g., ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 9(a); LA. CONST. art. VII, § 6(C); WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 6,
cl. 2(a).
43. Although a governor’s powers are a matter of state constitutional law, it is easy to
imagine a legislature’s decision on this score being final. For example, a legislature might
functionally repudiate debt by refusing to appropriate funding sufficient for its service or
redemption. Although one can imagine arguments to the contrary, it probably exceeds an
executive’s authority to raid funds appropriated for one purpose to satisfy his view of obligation
toward another.
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44

new terms of repayment. In Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of
45
Asbury Park, the Court upheld a New Jersey composition scheme
under which the state altered the maturity and interest rates
46
associated with municipal bonds issued by Asbury Park. During the
boom of the 1920s, the city had borrowed extensively to fund capital47
intensive improvements on the boardwalk. The reduction in tax
revenue associated with the Great Depression, coupled with cost
overruns and perhaps shoddy management, meant that the city could
48
not hope to repay its debt. Asbury Park defaulted and was placed
49
under state management akin to receivership. By statute the state’s
supreme court was permitted to adjust the interest and maturity terms
50
of municipal debt, provided that 85 percent of claimants consented.
The court approved such an agreement, and dissenting bondholders
51
brought their case to the federal judiciary. The Supreme Court
52
upheld the regime against a Contract Clause challenge. In the
Court’s view, although the composition reduced the nominal amount
owed on the bonds, it did not impair any practical right enjoyed by
53
the bondholders. The city’s promise to pay was a mere “paper right”
because the bondholders’ sole remedy, mandamus against local
officials to compel a tax, had proved historically, and as a practical
54
matter, to be an “empty right to litigate.”
Congress quickly abrogated Faitoute. States may no longer
compose the debts of their municipalities absent the consent of each
affected creditor; Chapter 9 is now the only route to adjustment of
55
municipal debt. But Faitoute’s rationale would seem to survive intact
44. For an explanation and defense of such “synthetic” bankruptcy, see Hynes, supra note
10, at 686–90. See also George Triantis, Bankruptcy for the States and by the States, in WHEN
STATES GO BROKE, supra note 3, at 237, 243 (arguing that states can and should create their
own bankruptcy regimes).
45. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
46. Id. at 516.
47. Id. at 503.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 505.
50. Id. at 504–05.
51. Id. at 507.
52. Id. at 516.
53. Id. at 512–16 (“The Constitution is ‘intended to preserve practical and substantial
rights, not to maintain theories.’” (quoting Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904))).
54. Id. at 510; see McConnell & Picker, supra note 12, at 430–33 (generally agreeing with
the Court’s assessment of the practical value of the mandamus remedy in this context).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (“[A] State law prescribing a method of composition of
indebtedness of such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such
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with respect to a state’s authority to compose its own debts. The right
to payment from the state treasury is much more precarious, much
more in the way of a “paper right,” than is the right to payment from
a municipality. However limited the value of mandamus might have
been in the context of a suit against a municipality, sovereign
immunity can preclude a remedy against a state entirely.
The advantage a state could derive from a composition statute
analogous to the one in Faitoute should not be overstated. Some
states’ constitutions would seem to preclude the tactic, for example by
declaring that debts are to be backed by the state’s “full faith and
56
credit.” Nor is it clear the courts would sanction an extreme
composition statute, were they to hear a challenge. The judgment in
Faitoute is more than seventy years old, and it rested as much on the
acquiescence of a supermajority of impaired creditors, and on the
observed reasonableness of the composition in question, as on the
57
emptiness of creditor remedies. In any event, though, sovereign
immunity likely means that state composition would be effective
whether or not it is substantively constitutional.
The states’ unilateral debt-adjustment authority poses a
seemingly intractable problem of credible commitment. Apparent
workarounds are doubtful for legal and pragmatic reasons. One
obvious question is why states do not simply consent to suit in federal
58
court if they wish to convey their seriousness. In short, the answer is
that doing so presents an analogous commitment problem. To be
59
sure, states are free to waive their sovereign immunity. But apart
from consent predicated on the receipt of federal spending, or where
composition; and . . . a judgment entered under such a law may not bind a creditor that does not
consent to such composition.”). The reach of this abrogation is now being tested in Puerto Rico,
which recently enacted legislation creating a mechanism for the adjustment of its municipal
corporations’ debts. Ley para el Cumplimiento con las Deudas y para la Recuperación de las
Corporaciones Públicas de Puerto Rico, P. del S. 1164, Ley Núm. 71 (June 28, 2014). Puerto
Rico contends that § 903 does not extend to the Territory, because Puerto Rico is not a “State”
for purposes of determining Chapter 9 eligibility. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012) (“The term
‘State’ includes the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, except for the purpose of defining
who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title.”).
56. See sources cited supra note 42.
57. Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 514.
58. See Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 334 n.68 (“A review of randomly selected state bond
indentures and state statutes revealed no effective waivers by states of sovereign immunity in
federal court.”).
59. See, e.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 617–18 (2002);
Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 n.19 (1982); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436,
447 (1883).
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60

Congress has otherwise abrogated immunity, states appear free to
61
renege on a stated policy of consent. Constitutional amendments
could perhaps do the trick—federal courts might ignore a state
attorney general’s invocation of sovereign immunity if her state’s
constitution flatly prohibited it. But such a significant political change
is not likely in the offing.
In limited circumstances, states might structure borrowing
transactions to circumvent the immunity problem and mirror secured
debt in the private context. A simple model would involve a state
pledging and transferring possession of assets as security for
repayment. If the state were to default, the creditor could satisfy her
claim without judicial assistance. Of course, the utility of such a
transaction would be sharply circumscribed by the paucity of
government assets amenable to this kind of pledge. It is hard to
imagine how a creditor could “take possession” of state highways,
parkland, or, for that matter, the capitol building. A more
sophisticated model might resemble the sale-leaseback transactions
62
into which some states have in fact entered in recent years. Even
here, though, the scope of a state’s borrowing capacity is quite
limited. The public-trust doctrine prohibits the sale of many state
63
assets, and it is not at all clear that a creditor holding title could call
60. For a doctrinal overview of Congress’s abrogation authority, see Rebecca E. Zietlow,
Federalism’s Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 141, 182–89 (2002). But note that Zietlow’s discussion predates Central Virginia
Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006), in which the Supreme Court held that
Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity via its power to make “uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S.
356, 378–79 (2006).
61. See Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858) (holding that a state could
withdraw statutory consent to be sued on a defaulted bond); see also Iowa Tribe of Kan. & Neb.
v. Salazar, 607 F.3d 1225, 1235 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The logic of Beers has withstood the test of
time.”).
62. See Cindy Holden, Calif. Governor Brown Cancels Sale of State Properties, CAL.
NEWSWIRE (Feb. 10, 2011), http://californianewswire.com/2011/02/10/CNW8510_000915.php
(discussing California’s scuttled sale-leaseback proposal); Jennifer Steinhauer, In Need of Cash,
Arizona Puts Offices on Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2009, at A16 (discussing Arizona’s current
sale-leaseback regime). In a sale-leaseback transaction, the owner of a valuable asset sells the
asset for a lump-sum payment, but continues in possession by leasing back the asset from the
buyer. The up-front infusion of cash to the seller, coupled with a periodic payment obligation by
the seller, resembles in many respects a traditional loan. See Ronald A. Morris, Sale-Leaseback
Transactions of Real Property—A Proposal, 30 TAX LAW. 701, 701 (1977) (describing some
versions of the sale-leaseback as “disguised loans”).
63. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (“The State can no more abdicate its
trust over property in which the whole people are interested . . . than it can abdicate its police
powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.”).
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on judicial assistance to evict government tenants or public users—or
that a creditor would want to put himself in the position of having to
do so. Moreover, structured transactions carry significant transaction
costs and appeal to a relatively narrow lender market. They raise
64
difficult problems of valuation and therefore graft.
B. Tax-Credit Borrowing as Risk-Free Debt
This Article introduces tax-credit borrowing as a mechanism by
which states can circumvent sovereign immunity and create risk-free
debt. The most straightforward example of what I have in mind is the
tax-credit bond. A tax-credit bond is identical in most respects to a
traditional bond. In exchange for an investor’s up-front contribution,
the state promises to repay principal plus a stated interest rate at the
bond’s maturity. Maturity and interest rates are determined by
market conditions and state and investor preferences. Depending on
the bond’s terms, repayment can be made periodically, with so-called
coupon payments, or can be made in a lump sum at maturity. The
bonds are freely alienable, and a vigorous secondary market may
emerge to reduce the transaction costs of transfer and therefore the
cost of borrowing.
The lone difference is the form of the state’s repayment. A
traditional bond is a demand on the treasury to cut a check for the
specified amount at maturity (or periodically, in the case of a couponbearing bond). A tax-credit bond, by contrast, entitles the holder to
deduct the agreed amount from her tax bill. Imagine a traditional
bond purchased today for $100. It represents a promise by the state to
pay $120 in ten years’ time. In a decade, the holder—who may or may
not have been the initial purchaser—may redeem the bond for a
check. The $120 payment can be understood as the return of $100 in
principal and $20 of interest, itself comprising a combination of the
time-value of $100 and the risk to the holder of the state’s default. A
corresponding tax-credit bond entitles the holder not to a check, but
to an offset of $120 to the taxes and fees she would otherwise owe the
65
state.

64. For another variation on the theme, see Julie A. Roin, Privatization and the Sale of Tax
Revenues, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1965, 2002–06 (2011).
65. I use this figure by way of illustration only. In practice, the amount a state would pay on
a $100 tax-credit bond would be less than on a traditional bond of the same denomination. See
infra note 71 and accompanying text.
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Tax-credit bonds have been little used in American history, but
they have some precedent. During the Civil War, West Virginia was
created out of the northwestern third of what was then the
66
Commonwealth of Virginia. The Old Dominion was relieved of its
war debt, but was still obliged on $30,000,000 in bonds it had issued to
fund general improvements. After the War, the Virginians held that
West Virginia should assume a share of the debt proportional to its
67
land mass. To effect their vision, the legislature enacted the Funding
68
Act of 1871. The Act authorized bondholders to redeem their bonds
for two newly issued instruments: (1) a certificate entitling the holder
to a share of any settlement with West Virginia (representing onethird of the initial bond’s nominal value), and (2) a newly issued
69
Virginia bond (representing two-thirds of the initial bond’s value).
To alleviate fear of repudiation, and thus encourage redemption on
its terms, the Commonwealth allowed the coupons associated with its
replacement bonds to be set off against the holder’s taxes. In the
language of the statute, the coupons were made “receivable at and
70
after maturity for all taxes, debts, dues, and demands due the state.”
Under Virginia’s scheme, only the coupons (and not the principal)
could be used to offset a holder’s tax liability. But the intuition
underlying the offset could be generalized to extend to principal.
At least since the mid-1990s, federal legislation has also seen a
tax-credit borrowing scheme put to use, although in a different
context and for a quite different purpose than this Article advocates.
In 1997, Congress authorized state and local governments to issue
$400,000,000 per year of what it dubbed “qualified zone academy
71
bonds” (QZABs). These QZABs, which granted the bearer an
offset to her federal taxes, could be issued to support infrastructure
development and other spending on presecondary schools for
72
children of low-income families. The details are unimportant here.

66. For a fuller account of the history of Virginia’s tax-credit-borrowing plan, see John V.
Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 1798–1908: A Case Study of Judicial
Power, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 439–47 (1983); Pomeroy, supra note 41, at 694–99.
67. Orth, supra note 66, at 439.
68. Funding Act of 1871, ch. 282, 1870–71 Va. Acts 378.
69. Id. §§ 2–3.
70. Id. § 2. The very next year, Virginia did in fact try to repudiate the tax-credit coupons.
For more on that, see infra notes 89–102 and accompanying text.
71. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1397E, 111 Stat. 788, 821–24
(1997) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1397E).
72. Id.
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The point is that these tax-credit bonds were employed as a federal
subsidy of congressionally preferred state and local activities.
Following the QZABs came a series of statutes authorizing the
issuance of the following tax-credit bonds to subsidize congressionally
73
favored activities: Clean Renewable Energy Bonds, Gulf Tax Credit
74
75
Bonds, Qualified Forestry Conservation Bonds, Qualified Energy
76
77
Conservation Bonds, Midwestern Disaster Area Bonds, and, most
recently, under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, Qualified School Construction Bonds, Build America Bonds,
78
and Recovery Zone Economic Development Bonds.
The recent federal incarnations of tax-credit borrowing suggest
that investors would be receptive to tax-credit bonds at the state level,
à la the Virginia prototype. Proceeds from their sale would not be
earmarked for particular objects of federal largesse, but could be used
for general state purposes.
The logic of using tax-credit bonds to create superpriority, riskfree debt stems from the Supreme Court’s understanding of sovereign
immunity. In particular, it relies on the procedural distinction
between plaintiff and defendant. The courts will not hear a private
79
plaintiff’s claim for damages against a state, but they will reject a
state’s claim against a private party according to the merits of the
defense. This is because sovereign immunity goes to the availability of
80
a remedy, not the existence of a substantive right. To realists it is
73. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1303, 119 Stat. 594, 992–96 (2005)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 54); Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110343, § 107, 122 Stat. 3765, 3817–19 (2008) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 54C).
74. Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-135, § 15316, 122 Stat. 2577, 2589–
93 (2005) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 54B).
75. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 301, 122 Stat. 1651,
2271–74 (2008) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 54D).
76. Id. § 301, 122 Stat. at 3841–44.
77. Id. § 702, 122 Stat. at 3912–18.
78. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 1521, 1531,
1400U-2, 123 Stat. 115, 349–50 (2009) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1400U-2).
79. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667–74 (1974).
80. This principle was, for example, at the center of the decision in Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 149 (1908) (“The question that arises is whether there is a remedy that the parties
interested may resort to, by going into a Federal court of equity, in a case involving a violation
of the Federal Constitution . . . .”). For a thorough explanation of the decision’s logic, see John
Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 996 (2008) (“But while the State was for
practical purposes a party, it was not so in a way that violated the principle of sovereign
immunity. Because the plaintiffs sought an anti-suit injunction that would enforce a defense
against the state, the suit in which Minnesota was in substance a party was also one in which
Minnesota was in substance the plaintiff and the railroads were the defendants. Asserting a
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something of a puzzle why permitting a claim is more offensive to a
state’s dignity and sovereignty than is sustaining a defense. But
doctrinally the difference is critical. When a state invokes the courts
to resolve its claims against a private party, the defendant is justified
in raising any defense she would otherwise have on the merits.
For the holder of a traditional bond, the remedy against a
recalcitrant state is the very suit for money damages that sovereign
immunity blocks. Redeeming a tax-credit bond, on the other hand,
requires no judicial aid. All the tax-credit bondholder must do is
claim the bond’s value as an offset to taxes otherwise owed. If the
issuing state wished to repudiate its obligation, it would need to sue
81
the holder for underpayment of taxes. This suit would grant the
holder a judicial forum in which she could assert her right to the
offset as a matter of contract.
In court, the redeemer would have a straightforward defense.
The tax-credit bond represents a binding contract that the state may
82
not impair consistent with the Contract Clause. In this setting the
judgment in Faitoute is inapplicable. Faitoute was premised on the
Justices’ conclusion that in practical terms, the bondholders were in a
better position after “impairment” than they would have been absent
83
New Jersey’s legislative action. The bondholders enjoyed only a
84
“paper” right to relief. And the price of the relevant bonds had
85
indeed increased after the state altered their terms. Thus, in the
Justices’ view, the bondholders had little to complain about. In this
defense against a government does not offend its sovereign immunity.”); id. at 1000 (“The
railroads in Perkins were thus using a familiar mode of proceeding by which a potential
defendant at law could sue in equity and present a legal position that would be a defense at law.
Because their position was a defense, not an affirmative claim on the State of Minnesota, a court
could grant relief without offending sovereign immunity.”).
81. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (forbidding the taking of property without “due
process of law”).
82. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (providing that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts”). The federal nature of the Contract Clause defense
supplies the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to review any state court decision rejecting it. See
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2012) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State
in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari
where . . . the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States . . . .”). Thus, even if the
state were to sue the redeemer in a favorable tribunal—before, say, elected judges sharing the
legislature’s view of the political merits of repudiation—the redeemer could ultimately find
redress in federal court.
83. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 515–16 (1942).
84. Id. at 516.
85. Id. at 513.

BUCCOLA IN PRINTER FINAL - FOR KRISTI (DO NOT DELETE)

10/21/2014 5:07 PM

254

[Vol. 64:235

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

sense Faitoute can be read to validate parties’ pragmatic resolution of
a well-known holdout problem in multilateral restructurings. Perhaps
the decision could even support a state’s unilateral restructuring of
traditional debt obligations, were the case somehow to reach federal
86
court.
But the situation is quite different in the case of a state wishing
to repudiate a tax-credit bond. The holder of such a bond enjoys
more than a “paper” right. Her right to payment, in the form of an
offset, is self-executing upon redemption. Any attempt by the state to
shortchange the bondholder would represent a practical as well as
87
theoretical impairment. The skepticism with which the Court has
generally viewed state attempts to alter their own contracts would
seem paramount. A quarter century after Faitoute, for example, the
Justices neatly summarized the vision animating Contract Clause
jurisprudence in this domain: a state “cannot refuse to meet its
legitimate financial obligations simply because it would prefer to
spend the money to promote the public good than the private welfare
88
of its creditors.”
This understanding of sovereign immunity’s implications for taxcredit borrowing was put to the test, and confirmed, when Virginia
sought to repudiate its tax-credit coupons in the late nineteenth
89
century. Shortly after Virginia enacted the Funding Act of 1871, a
group of politicians called the “Readjusters” came to power in
90
Richmond. The Readjusters sought to repudiate the tax-credit
91
coupons issued to resolve Virginia’s antebellum debts. They enacted
a series of laws, known as “coupon killers,” that aimed to destroy the
financial value of the Commonwealth’s obligations, if not the

86. Such anyway is the supposition of Hynes, supra note 10, at 681–82.
87. One qualification is worth noting. Although a state cannot default directly, clever
legislators might seek to do so underhandedly. Rather than deny the effect of the bond itself,
the state could impose a separate tax on bondholders or those who redeem bonds. This would
practically cancel the bonds’ effectiveness. The courts might be expected to lump such
legislation together with the bond promise and hold it void under the Contract Clause. But as a
matter of prudence, tax-credit bonds could include a promise by the state not to impose a
discriminatory tax on account of the holder’s possession or redemption. This sort of promise
would itself form part of the “Obligation of Contract[]” beyond the state’s power to impair. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
88. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29 (1977).
89. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
90. Orth, supra note 66, at 440–41.
91. Id.
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92

obligations themselves. The most prominent and direct effort was a
statute barring tax collectors from accepting the coupons in payment
93
of taxes. The act declared that only gold, silver, U.S. Treasury notes,
and national-bank notes would be receivable in payment of debts
94
owed to the Commonwealth.
The validity of this attempt at repudiation came to a head in the
Supreme Court in 1885, in what are known as the Virginia Coupon
95
Cases. The basic fact pattern of these cases is simple enough. A
96
bondholder tendered coupons to the taxman and was rebuffed. The
tax collector then levied on the bondholder’s assets for
underpayment, and this decision set the stage for an action in detinue
97
by the bondholder. The merits of the detinue action turned on
98
whether the bondholder was in fact delinquent in paying his taxes.
The Court held, first, that federal jurisdiction existed because the
actions were not suits against the state for purposes of sovereign
99
immunity; and, second, that the Constitution invalidated Virginia’s
100
law purporting to strip the coupons of their value as tax credit.
Whatever a state’s machinations, the Court insisted that a bond
permitting the holder to offset taxes would be enforced:
The contract with Virginia was not only that the coupons should be
received in payment of taxes, but, by necessary implication, that the
tax-payer making such a tender should not be molested further, as
though he were a delinquent, and that for every illegal attempt
subsequently to enforce the collection of the tax, by the seizure of
property, he should have remedies of the law in force when the
101
contract was made, for redress, or others equally effective.

The Coupon Cases did not end Virginia’s attempts to repudiate its
tax-credit obligations. But in each instance, before and after Hans,

92. For a discussion of Virginia’s attempts to repudiate, see id. at 439–47.
93. Id. at 440.
94. Id. at 442.
95. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885). For an account of legal wrangling over the
Virginia scheme before and after the Coupon Cases, see Orth, supra note 66, at 439–47.
96. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. at 273.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 308.
99. Id. at 288.
100. Id. at 303–04.
101. Id.
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the Supreme Court held the line. For purposes of sovereign
immunity, tax-credit borrowing works differently from traditional
modes of state borrowing.
Thoughtful readers might question whether the result in the
Coupon Cases would hold today, eighty years after Home Building &
103
Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell held that the financial emergency associated
with the Great Depression justified state interference with
104
contractual obligations. But although the cases following Blaisdell
have undoubtedly empowered states to interfere with contracts to a
greater extent than they could have in the nineteenth century, little in
the development of Contract Clause jurisprudence would seem to
undermine the Coupon Cases. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that state attempts to impair contracts to which they themselves
105
are a party should be viewed skeptically.
Thus, tax-credit borrowing has the capacity to create something
approaching risk-free debt. In the first analysis, the superior
credibility of tax-credit borrowing can reduce a state’s borrowing
costs. Return to the example presented above: a bond selling for $100
and obliging the state to pay $120 in ten years’ time. The nominal $20
benefit to the lender represents the sum of the time-value of the
lender’s money and a premium corresponding to the presumed risk of
the state’s default. Suppose the time-value component came to $18.
102. One contemporary account summarized the controversy and the line of cases before
and after 1885 this way:
New bonds were issued, the State contracting that the coupons annexed should be
receivable for all taxes. For twenty-seven years this legislation has been upheld,
except as to one sort of tax, which under the Constitution of Virginia was payable
only in specie. But during all that time the legislature has done its best to impair the
State’s agreement. A statute was passed in 1887 providing that only gold, silver,
United States treasury notes, and national bank notes, were receivable for taxes; and
by virtue of this statute the present plaintiff was refused relief when he took the
proper steps to obtain credit, in payment of taxes, for the coupons which he held. The
highest court of the State held the entire coupon agreement unconstitutional, the
whole vitiated by the part which was formerly held invalid. It was urged that the
Supreme Court could not review this decision; but the court has taken the other view,
reversed the judgment of the Virginia court, held the funding contract valid, and
decided that it is impaired by the later statute.
Note, Another Virginia Coupon Case, 12 HARV. L. REV. 421, 421 (1899); see David P. Currie,
Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government Officers, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 149, 152–54
(1984); Orth, supra note 66, at 439–47 (summarizing the Virginia Coupon Cases).
103. Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
104. Id. at 437.
105. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 505 (1987); U.S. Trust
Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29 (1977); see also Brenner M. Fissell, Note, The Dual
Standard of Review in Contracts Clause Jurisprudence, 101 GEO. L.J. 1089, 1091–93 (2013)
(describing the “stricter standard” applied to self-interested states).
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(That is, an analogous U.S. Treasury bond, usually thought to
approximate risk-free debt, would pay $118.) With a tax-credit bond
the default premium would shrink to something approaching zero. To
raise $100 today, holding all else equal, the state would need to
promise only $118 in a decade rather than $120.
To capture this intuition, it may be helpful to think of tax-credit
borrowing as a species of the “toggling” transactions that permeate
commercial relationships. The logic of tax-credit borrowing is to
increase the value of a substantive promise—the obligation to
repay—by inverting traditional procedural roles to enhance the
promisee’s certainty. It is a way for parties to opt out of seemingly
fixed legal rules of procedure in order to maximize their joint surplus.
The ancient institution of the pawn shop is a good illustration of
this kind of toggling. X wants to borrow from Y and is willing to pay a
competitive interest rate. X is trustworthy, but his trustworthiness is
not observable to Y. Y consults her lawyer and learns that recovery in
the event of X’s breach is costly. If X defaults, Y must file an action,
obtain a judgment (by default or otherwise), find X’s assets, and then
levy upon them. Execution may prove too expensive even assuming
that X has assets. X, too, knows that legal process may not be worth
the candle to Y, and his knowledge reduces his credibility even
further in Y’s eyes. The expense of civil procedure threatens to
prevent X from demonstrating his credibility; thus, collateral is born.
X gives Y possession of his prized guitar. Now, in case of default, Y
need not resort to costly procedures that both parties know will have
little if any net value to her. She may simply foreclose. If there is a
dispute about X’s right to the guitar, X must now sue Y. The toggle is
complete.
Tax-credit borrowing has the capacity to reduce borrowing costs
just as pawning does. Its broader significance for state fiscal policy
turns, however, on the specifics of its use and on the dynamics of state
political economy. Tax-credit borrowing reduces the cost of debt
because it precludes default. This does not mean it precludes financial
distress. Rather, it shifts the incidence of distress away from the
creditor and toward a state’s other constituents. Whether such a shift
is normatively preferable depends on, among other things, its
expected effects on state financial decisions—states’ borrowing as
well as taxing and spending policies.
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C. Practical Obstacles
The limited American experience with tax-credit borrowing
suggests that it is a viable form of financing state expenditures, at
least on a small scale. But it is fair to ask whether the scope of taxcredit borrowing could ever be wide enough to have a significant
impact on a state’s political economy; and, if it could, why tax-credit
borrowing has been so rare historically. This Part considers three of
the keenest practical objections: insufficient liquidity in secondary
markets, federal tax policy, and the tradability of pension obligations.
1. Insufficient Liquidity in Secondary Markets. One criticism of
tax-credit borrowing is that the secondary market for tax credits may
not be robust enough to support large issuances of tax-credit bonds.
A secondary market is critical. There is no particular reason to think
that the initial buyers of a state’s tax credits will themselves be able to
use all of the offset rights they receive in exchange for lending. A
creditor may not expect her future tax bills to exceed the face value of
her offsets. She might expect little future income, for example; she
might not own much taxable property; she might move to a different
state. Surely the prospect that credits would go to waste would
undermine lenders’ incentive to accept an offset right in lieu of cash.
Secondary markets in traditional state and municipal bonds are
highly liquid and efficient. Even in 1972, William Staats, of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, was able to write that
“[c]ommunications networks enable sellers to exhibit bonds
throughout the Nation in less than 3 hours. Large or small blocks of
bonds of various maturities—whether issued by well-known or quite
obscure government entities—may be sold through the secondary
106
107
market . . . .” Since then, transaction costs have only diminished.
But unlike traditional bonds, tax-credit bonds hold intrinsic value
only to the extent that market participants expect to owe taxes to the
issuing state. Those who expect to pay such taxes will value a taxcredit bond at just below face value at the time of maturity, but such
106. William F. Staats, The Secondary Market for State and Local Government Bonds, in 3
REAPPRAISAL OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE DISCOUNT MECHANISM 3 (1972), available at
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/federal%20reserve%20history/discountmech/bog_rea
ppraisal_discount_197108_vol3.pdf.
107. See Lawrence E. Harris & Michael S. Piwowar, Secondary Trading Costs in the
Municipal Bond Market, 61 J. FIN. 1361, 1363–64 (2006) (noting that municipal-bond trading
may be more efficient because it is not subject to particular trading hours and because webbased trading has become prevalent).
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taxpayers represent only a fraction of debt-market participants.
Viable secondary markets for the tax-credit bonds of the most
populous states are sure to develop. But what about markets for the
bonds of low-population states with small tax bases, such as Wyoming
or Alaska?
There are at least two plausible lines of response. The first is
convertibility. A state could issue bonds promising to pay a specified
amount from the state treasury, but granting the holder an option to
convert the obligation into a tax credit. This was the approach
108
Virginia took with its tax-credit coupons in the nineteenth century.
The value of the option to convert—that is, the discount at which taxcredit bonds trade relative to traditional bonds—would represent the
market’s view of the expected cost of repudiation to the traditional
bondholder. For an especially solvent and “trustworthy” state, the
option would be worth very little: the difference between tax-credit
borrowing and traditional borrowing would be negligible. In other
words, debt-market participants would value convertible instruments
much as they would any other bond in financially stable times. Only
in periods of financial distress would the pool of willing buyers
109
shrink. But to the extent tax-credit borrowing can be expected to
110
reduce the ratio of a state’s borrowing to revenue, the process of
issuing these bonds could itself mitigate the liquidity problem.
Alternatively (or additionally), smaller-population states might
consider an interstate compact to develop a nationwide secondary
market. To illustrate, Oregon could promise to honor the tax credits
associated with bonds issued by New Jersey. The states would then
net out their mutual obligations at an agreed date. This kind of
reciprocity agreement would be enforceable in federal court—the
federal judicial power extends “to Controversies between two or
111
more States.” After all, the right sought to be enforced would be a

108. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
109. As the risk of repudiation increases, so too does the probability that a holder will opt to
convert. It is the act of conversion—or, rather, the likelihood of conversion—that could drive
investors out of the market for these bonds. Ironically, to the extent a viable secondary market
could be sustained, it is precisely during periods of financial distress that the spread between a
traditional bond and a convertible bond will be greatest.
110. See infra notes 192–95 and accompanying text.
111. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Moreover, an action to settle up would not seem to implicate
New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 88–91 (1883), which holds that the Eleventh
Amendment bars a debt action by one state against another where the plaintiff state seeks to
enforce a right properly belonging to its citizens.
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right of the plaintiff state in the first instance, not one derived from or
assigned by one of its citizens.
2. Federal Tax Policy. In some measure, federal legislation is
probably needed to spur tax-credit borrowing. At a minimum, the
Tax Code would need to be amended to undo what is in effect a
relative subsidy of traditional bond borrowing. Section 103 of the Tax
Code excludes from gross income the interest a taxpayer earns on
112
most state and municipal bonds. No corresponding provision
excludes the interest “income” a tax-credit bond provides in the form
of reduced tax liability. This means that the holder of a traditional
bond receives more after-tax benefit than does the holder of an
113
otherwise identical tax-credit bond. To achieve parity under the
existing regime and so as to attract investor interest, states would
have to offer a higher rate of return on tax-credit bonds, something
114
they plainly have no interest in doing.
3. Tradability of Pension Obligations. A related obstacle turns
on the realistic scope of tax-credit borrowing. It would be easy
enough to replace traditional bonds with tax-credit bonds; the
plausibility of that change should not provoke much quarrel. But, a
115
critic might say, bonds comprise only a part of state borrowing.
States “borrow” far more from workers, the repayment obligations
116
taking the form of pension and other retirement benefits. Unlike
with bonds, the extent of the state’s pension obligation to any
particular employee depends on a host of factors not easily
determined until that employee retires. Seniority, peak salary, age at

112. 26 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
113. Issuing convertible instruments would reduce the tax disadvantage imposed by § 103
because, when the issuing state is financially healthy, bondholders can be expected simply to
receive interest payments as they do with respect to a traditional bond.
114. At an assumed tax rate of 35 percent, the after-tax yield of a traditional bond is more
than 50 percent greater than that of a nominally identical tax-credit bond. To attract investors to
the tax-credit bond under the current regime, states would have to offer a correspondingly
higher interest rate.
115. See ANDREW ANG & RICHARD C. GREEN, LOWERING BORROWING COSTS FOR
STATES AND MUNICIPALITIES THROUGH COMMONMUNI 33 (2011), available at
https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/aang/papers/THP%20ANG-GREEN%20DiscusPape
_Feb2011.pdf (“Assets in state pension plans total less than $2.0 trillion at the same date and,
thus, Novy-Marx and Rauh estimate the underfunding of state pension plans to be
approximately $3.2 trillion. In comparison, the outstanding publicly traded debt issued by states
is approximately only $1 trillion.”).
116. See, e.g., Skeel, Is Bankruptcy, supra note 10, at 1072–73.
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retirement, and other uncertain determinants mean that the state’s
debt is indefinite in the year that credit (that is, labor) is supplied. No
obviously fungible instrument can be issued to, say, a twenty-fiveyear-old employee. At retirement, to be sure, the state could issue
certificates specifying the periodic (convertible?) tax credit to which
the retiree is entitled; these would seem amenable to trade. But a
potential difficulty arises if, by the time of an employee’s retirement,
the obligor state faces financial difficulty and refuses to issue the
certificate to which the employee is entitled.
Whether this is a real problem turns on the propriety of a
117
mandamus remedy. In one sense, a mandamus petition for the
issuance of a pension certificate could be thought to aim directly at
the state’s treasury in a manner that sovereign immunity precludes.
The reason for the petition is of course to deprive the state of
revenue. Yet this is probably not the most persuasive way to
118
understand such a remedy. Mandamus would not formally turn on
an entitlement to the state’s funds. It would rather seek to require a
public official to deliver documentation of a right—the right to a
119
specific pension amount—that is not itself questioned.
II. THE PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE STATE DEBT
Many states today are in the red, and by no small amount.
Depending on one’s assumptions, pension shortfalls alone account for
120
between roughly one and three trillion dollars of debt. The share of
121
the GDP devoted to servicing current obligations is growing. One
should not fall prey to hindsight bias and conclude in every case of
financial distress that the level of borrowing was superoptimal when
viewed ex ante. The world is probabilistic, and sometimes debt
117. For a discussion of the effect of sovereign immunity on the feasibility of a mandamus
remedy against the state, see supra Part I.A.
118. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 (1974) (explaining that a suit for injunctive
relief against a state actor is not barred simply because the relief will have an effect on the state
treasury).
119. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 167–70 (1803) (holding that mandamus
against a state actor is an appropriate remedy, although not within the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction, for a state actor’s refusal to deliver documentation of petitioner’s legal right).
120. See, e.g., Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, Public Pension Promises: How Big Are
They and What Are They Worth?, 66 J. FIN. 1211, 1213 (2011) (reporting aggregate
underfunding of accrued pension liabilities, as of June 2009, at between $1.26 trillion and $2.49
trillion); Mary Williams Walsh, Ratings Service Finds Pension Shortfall, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2013, at B1 (reporting an estimated $980 billion shortfall).
121. For a summary, see Cooper & Walsh, supra note 5.
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burdens that seem reasonable when incurred turn out to be
unsustainable. But there is little doubt that in recent decades some
states have borrowed, and are now borrowing, far too much.
Appropriate terminology should be used here. How much debt is
“just right” depends on deeply contested normative views of
government’s role, the appropriate discount rate to apply to the
future, and similar factors. Ultimately the standard one chooses is of
little importance to this Article’s central themes. But it may be worth
positing a definition of excessive debt that will focus some of the
analysis that follows. I have in mind debt that results in socially
wasteful spending—projects that the polity, however defined, values
at less than cost. If for whatever reason the person or persons who
make spending decisions take less than full account of the cost of
spending, then the state will spend on wasteful projects by forcing
others to pay a share of the price. Debt is just such a way to
externalize costs. (By contrast, a state borrows too little if it cannot
fund positive-value projects, the costs of which are borne by current
taxpayers but the benefits of which extend to future or foreign
residents.)
This Part explores the leading explanations of excessive state
debt. Scholars have identified two principal, competing theories: the
incentive of a state, understood as a collective entity, to externalize
financial risk onto residents of other states; and the difficulty a state’s
residents experience in monitoring political actors who may find it in
their personal interest to fund current spending projects with future
payment obligations. Parts III and IV will consider the impact taxcredit borrowing might have on these problems.
A. Risk Externalization
As it applies to the states, risk externalization refers to the
tendency of a state to push some of the expected cost of debt
repayment onto the residents of other states, typically by seeking
federal aid. On this view, states systematically overborrow as they try
to impose the losses associated with bad fiscal conditions on sister
states through the use of federal-government resources. Lenders,
whether they be bond buyers, trade creditors, or employees, charge
122
the state for its leverage, but they charge less than they would
absent the possibility of federal assistance. The joint surplus of the
122. And the empirical evidence shows that lenders do adjust prices as a state becomes
more or less likely to default. See Rodden, supra note 20, at 128.
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state and its creditors is maximized by shifting some of the cost of
debt. Thus, the state borrows more than it would if a federal backstop
were unavailable.
An analogy to corporate law may help clarify the intuition. It is
hornbook law that corporations enjoy limited liability. The
significance of this doctrine is straightforward: creditors are out of
luck if the value of corporate assets cannot fully compensate them;
they may not demand that shareholders make them whole. As a
consequence, shareholders, and presumably the managers who
represent them, do not fully weigh the probable costs of the firm’s
activities. Their private loss is capped at the amount of investment,
but the potential public injury is not. Scholars have long attacked
limited liability on the ground that it encourages inefficiently risky
projects, the downside costs of which are borne by involuntary
123
creditors (for example, tort victims ). And it is this very concern that
underlies bonding requirements in some industries as well as the
familiar rules of corporate-veil piercing. The aim of such policies is to
force corporate decisionmakers to internalize the expected costs, as
well as the benefits, of the risks they undertake.
Unlike private firms, states cannot externalize financial risk by
operation of law. They rely on positive action from the federal
government, whether in the form of congressional appropriation or
discretionary spending by the executive. But why would the federal
government assist a financially distressed state, especially since doing
so would tend to exacerbate moral hazard? There are two general
rationales: economic self-interest and sympathetic identification.
The self-interest story begins with the intimate economic
124
relationship of states in a fiscal federation such as the United States.

123. E.g., David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1565, 1565 n.4 (1991) (collecting sources); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and
Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 128–29 (1991) (“Maybe limited liability should
be denied to firms that adopt limited liability only with respect to tort creditors or that have less
than a minimal amount of capitalization or insurance.”); see generally Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J.
1879 (1991) (comparing the consequences of limited and unlimited liability for corporations).
124. To be clear, it is the degree of correlation of states’ economies that matters for this
purpose, not their formal status as members of a fiscal federation. See generally Stephen J. Choi,
Mitu Gulati & Eric Posner, The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 131 (2012) (generalizing reasons why, in the sovereign context, third-party countries
may bail out debtors). Yet because the economies of federal members tend to be more linked
than, say, the economies of New Zealand and Hungary, the threat of externalization looms
largest in the context of a fiscal federation.
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When states’ economic lives are closely intertwined, one state’s
default—and even uncertainty regarding the possibility of its
default—can ripple through the broader economy. The economic
depression associated with massive debt obligations reduces wealth in
the affected state, and therefore reduces demand by the state’s
residents for the goods and services produced in other states.
Imagine, for example, that California’s forty million citizens suddenly
stopped buying products from the rest of the country. It would
devastate industry far beyond state lines, and the multiplier effect
could wreak havoc. This is an unrealistically extreme example, of
course, but it grimly illustrates the spillover effects of financial
distress. Contagion more narrowly defined is also a threat. If a state’s
default were to fall particularly hard on a certain class of creditor—
say, financial institutions—then the effect could ripple quickly
through the economy. Thus, when one state’s default seems possible,
it may be in the nation’s interest to intervene with assistance. Indeed,
federal governments struggle greatly not to provide assistance when
125
doing so would avoid a greater calamity.
There is reason to doubt how serious of an issue contagion really
is in the state–federal context. If, for example, a state’s debt were held
by its own citizens in proportion to income, then a default would
accomplish precisely the same thing as a tax increase. The likelihood
of contagion is an empirical question, the resolution of which is
beyond this Article’s scope. But in any event, the important question
for assessing federal incentives is not how contagious states’ default
ought to be as a matter of economic theory. It is how markets will
react on this score—and the risk of a bad reaction may itself supply a
reason to intervene.
A less rigorous, yet perhaps equally important, explanation for
risk externalization is simple fellow feeling. One does not like to see
one’s countrymen suffering, especially if those suffering do not
appear immediately at fault. At a general level this explanation has
nothing to do with debt per se. Think of the popularity of federal
disaster-relief programs. Whether explicitly or implicitly, the federal
126
government partially insures victims of natural disaster.
125. See Levitin, supra note 10, at 499 (observing that “when scared, governments bail, as
shown by the United States in 1992 (bailing out Mexico absent authority), the United States in
2008 (stretching section 13(3) authority), and the European Union in 2010 (bailing out Greece
despite a no-bailouts clause in the E.U. Treaty)”).
126. Howard Kunreuther, Disaster Mitigation and Insurance: Learning from Katrina, 604
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 208, 214–16 (2006).
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Catastrophic damage is often seen as an act of God, even though it is
widely known that the probability of natural disaster is much greater
127
in some regions of the country than in others. This insurance gives
rise to moral hazard, leading to greater-than-optimal investment in
disaster-prone areas, and represents a form of risk externalization. A
similar dynamic is at play in calls to help “blameless” communities
128
facing crushing debt.
Self-interest and pity are cumulative, and it is some admixture of
the two that explains the federal urge to bail out heavily indebted
states. The empirical significance of risk externalization is
unfortunately difficult to test. For one thing, it is no small matter even
to agree on when a “bailout” has happened. The responsible political
actors are unlikely to label their actions as such. Relief may not be
directed immediately to creditors. Instead, it will more likely be
packaged as assistance to a community—to local industry or to
individual residents. In 2013, Detroit’s emergency manager declared
that he would not seek federal dollars to pay off creditors, but that
the city would need special assistance to tear down dilapidated
129
buildings. Because money is fungible, this is an economically
irrelevant distinction. The question is simply whether a jurisdiction
and its creditors, viewed as a joint enterprise, are able to extract more
cash from the federal treasury than they would otherwise be entitled
to. Yet rhetorical ambiguities make the problem a difficult one to
study.
It is also important to keep in mind that even with the possibility
of a federal bailout, traditional creditors will respond to a state’s
financial distress by lobbying for concessions (that is, revenue
increases or spending cuts). Federal assistance is unlikely to make
creditors whole; creditors would prefer that the state pay in full. The

127. Where to Live to Avoid a Natural Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/01/weekinreview/01safe.html (reporting that residents of
Corvallis, Oregon, face the smallest risk, and that Dallas, Texas, is most prone to natural
disaster).
128. Consider in this regard the recent reports from Detroit that 911 calls are typically
unanswered for an hour, notwithstanding that the city is sitting on billions of dollars of art. See
Lisa Lambert, ‘No Bailout’: Senators Look To Pre-empt U.S. Aid to Detroit, REUTERS, July 25,
2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/25/us-usa-detroit-congress-idUSBRE
96O1DO20130725; Kim Peterson, A 911 Response in Detroit Takes How Long?, MSN (July 9,
2013, 1:52 PM), http://money.msn.com/now/post--a-911-response-in-detroit-takes-how-long.
129. Jonathan Oosting, Michigan Approved for $100 Million in Federal Funding to Demolish
Blighted Homes in 5 Cities, MLIVE, June 6, 2013 (4:27 PM, updated June 6, 2013, 7:17 PM),
www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/06/michigan_100_million_demolitio.html.
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extent of a state’s apparent moral hazard will thus turn in part on the
political power of creditors. Consider, for example, the largely foreign
130
creditors who bore the brunt of state defaults in the 1840s. They
were unable to exert the influence needed to right the ship before it
was too late. A very different picture emerges if some or all creditors
are effective political operators. Could public-employee unions be
such a class? The jury is out.
Whatever the exact empirical significance of risk externalization,
many thoughtful observers believe it to be a significant factor in statedebt levels. As Professor Clayton Gillette observes, “Credit markets
likely apply a positive value to the probability of a federal bailout of
states, just as they applied a positive value to the probability of a
federal bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, notwithstanding the
131
absence of any legal obligation.” And recent calls for explicit
federal bond insurance, an indirect cross-subsidy of the most
imprudent states by the most prudent ones, suggest that Gillette is
132
right.
The federal backstop puts a floor on the damage a member state
can expect to bear in bad fiscal conditions. As a consequence, a given
state’s activities reflect a greater appetite for risk than they otherwise
would. The state’s potential creditors see the same dynamic, and in
response charge the state lower interest rates than its default risk
would otherwise justify. Neither the state nor its creditors want
economic turmoil, of course; all do better if the economy remains
vital. Yet as a group they maximize their joint surplus by increasing
state debt and, therefore, the risk of a calamitous default in the first
instance.
To be sure, federal intervention is no certainty. And it is unlikely
to make state creditors whole or to come without strings attached.
The state-debt markets clearly reflect the heterogeneity of risk posed
133
by investment in the various states. The point is not that states and

130. William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State
Debts in the 1840’s, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 259, 261 (1996).
131. Clayton P. Gillette, Political Will and Fiscal Federalism in Municipal Bankruptcy 52
(N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-22, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793173.
132. See, e.g., Richard J. Riordan & Tim Rutten, Op-Ed., A Plan to Avert the Pension Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2013, at A17 (arguing that the federal government should intervene and
bail out Detroit).
133. See Rodden, supra note 20, at 137 (commenting on credit-default-swap prices after
2008).
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their creditors fully externalize risk, only that they may do so on the
margins and to a degree that significantly affects state policy.
B. Agency Problems
A competing, though complementary, suite of theories explains
overborrowing as a consequence of political dysfunction within a
state. Although the details of these theories vary, they share a
fundamental premise: that elected representatives find it in their selfinterest to borrow excessively to fund current expenditures. These
theories depend on a corollary view that the polity does a poor job of
disciplining political actors who take on debt to pay for projects that
the polity, as a whole, values below cost.
A vast literature, dating at least to Adam Smith, explains why
incumbent politicians are often willing to eat the seed corn, spending
134
today on popular projects while seeking to pay for them tomorrow.
More recent theorists have set out a number of rationales to explain
why elected representatives might choose to fund current spending
with debt rather than with tax revenue. Imagine, for example, an
incumbent who anticipates that his spending priorities will differ from
135
those of his successors. Such an incumbent may want to borrow in
the current term in order to constrain the spending possibilities of
136
future officeholders. One model suggests that representatives who
desire a low-spending policy will over-rely on borrowing for the same
137
reason. Or a representative may believe that his tenure in office
depends on constituents who value current spending highly because
they do not expect to pay their fair share of future taxes—either

134. See, e.g., 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. V, ch. III (Edwin Cannan, ed., Methuen & Co., 5th ed. 1904); DAVID
RICARDO, Essay on the Funding System, in THE WORKS OF DAVID RICARDO 455 (McCulloch
ed., 1846); Richard E. Wagner, Revenue Structure, Fiscal Illusion, and Budgetary Choice, 25
PUB. CHOICE 45 (1976); see generally Alberto Alesina & Allan Drazen, Why Are Stabilizations
Delayed? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3053, 1989), available at
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4553028/alesina_whystabilizations.pdf?sequence=2.
135. See, e.g., Torsten Persson & Lars E. O. Svensson, Why a Stubborn Conservative Would
Run a Deficit: Policy With Time-Inconsistent Preferences, 104 Q. J. ECON. 325, 325 (1989).
136. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and
Government Debt, 57 REV. ECON. STUD. 403, 403 (1990) (offering the example of two parties
who disagree about spending priorities, with each encouraged to use debt strategically).
137. See generally Roland Hodler, Elections and the Strategic Use of Budget Deficits, 148
PUB. CHOICE 149 (2011) (explaining how an incumbent who prefers low public spending will
use debt to constrain later high-spending officials).
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because they expect to move or because they expect to pay a low tax
rate in the future.
Politicians’ preferences are of course constrained. At times, the
popular will has reflected a powerfully antidebt sentiment. After the
defaults of the 1840s, the people in many states ratified constitutional
amendments aimed at eliminating or at least reducing the tendency to
138
rely on borrowing. Those were different times, of course, and most
scholars believe the amendments did little to curb debt in the long
139
term. But those amendments do indicate a limit to society’s
tolerance of debt. Agency theories of excessive debt do not reject that
principle; they posit only that states tend to overborrow.
But why would voters tend not to punish politicians for spending
on unworthy projects, even if the spending is put off to the future? A
partial explanation looks to the differences among constituents in the
proportion of benefits received from spending initiatives and costs
borne under current and anticipated tax policy. Perhaps constituents
who benefit from excessive debt are better able to form powerful
coalitions. Dispersion on the part of those harmed may prevent them
from learning about borrowing policy, from doing anything about it,
or both. On another prevalent account, many residents are simply
140
fiscally deceived. Current taxes and levels of services are salient, but
people do not perceive as clearly the consequences of future
obligations to repay: out of sight, out of mind. A former Chicago
alderman speaking recently about the city’s looming pension crisis
nicely summed up this agency theory of excessive debt: “Voters don’t
care about pensions as an abstract issue. . . . What they care about are
the effects over the next two years of having to cut services or raise
141
taxes to pay for this.” What these explanations have in common is
the assumption of a voting public that is ill-suited to monitor and
discipline spendthrift politicians.
138. See Roin, supra note 64, at 1975 (“Constitutional limitations on the use of state
government debt did not appear until the 1840s.”); Silvers, supra note 3, at 42 (“When states
were unable to repay their borrowings, they went through painful periods of fiscal adjustment
that led to the adoption in most states of rules forbidding states to run operating deficits and
limiting borrowing to funding discrete capital investments.”).
139. Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo & John Joseph Wallis, Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Crises, in
WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra note 3, at 9, 37; Roin, supra note 64, at 1977–78.
140. See generally Wagner, supra note 134 (describing how taxpayer perceptions of the cost
of government can be influenced by the complexity of methods used to finance public output).
141. Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Chicago Sees Pension Crisis Drawing Near,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/06/us/chicagosees-pension-crisis-drawing-near.html (quotation marks omitted).
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One might expect market forces to constrain politicians’ appetite
for borrowing even if voters do not. In the corporate-debt market, for
example, lenders carefully monitor their borrowers’ leverage. The
higher the leverage, the greater the risk of default if revenues
142
decrease relative to market expectations. To compensate for the
risk of default, lenders therefore charge higher interest rates to more
highly leveraged firms, all else being equal. At some point credit
simply dries up. This may be true in the state-debt markets, too, and it
would suggest a ceiling to state indebtedness. But because lenders
care about risk-adjusted returns rather than the wisdom of their
borrowers’ expenditures, the point at which creditors simply stop
lending is not likely related to optimal fiscal policy.
III. TAX-CREDIT BORROWING AND RISK EXTERNALIZATION
Risk externalization depends on the possibility of federal succor,
and its importance grows with the likelihood that financial distress
will meet a receptive audience in Washington. Those concerned with
the associated moral hazard have observed that federal aid is more
likely when a state can claim an inability to service its massive debt
burden. The pathetic appeal to helplessness, coupled with the threat
of spillover effects and contagion that might follow a disorderly
default, therefore combine to powerful effect. Seeking to relieve
bailout pressure, and therefore moral hazard, a number of scholars in
the last few years have proposed legislation permitting states to seek
143
bankruptcy relief. The details have varied, but they generally have
taken as a model Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.
This Part gives background on Chapter 9 and the statebankruptcy debate, and argues that voluntary debt-adjustment
mechanisms are unlikely to dampen moral hazard. It then shows how
tax-credit borrowing could more effectively achieve the aims
motivating proposals for state-bankruptcy legislation.
A. Background: Chapter 9 and the State-Bankruptcy Debate
Prior to the Great Depression, no formal mechanism existed by
which the debt of public entities could be restructured. In 1933,
142. Leverage refers to the ratio between the debts a firm owes and its assets. A low degree
of leverage implies a large equity cushion to absorb losses before they affect creditors.
143. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Triantis, supra note 44, at 240; Adam
Feibelman, Involuntary Bankruptcy for American States, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81,
81–83 (2012).
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Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act to allow distressed towns and
cities to adjust debts that had become unsustainable as the national
144
economic malaise persisted. This legislation was addressed in
particular to the familiar problem of holdout creditors. When a
debtor entity’s liabilities become too great relative to its ability to
generate revenue, a measure of relief can be in the best interests of
the debtor and its creditors alike. The Great Depression undoubtedly
145
saw many such cases.
Individual creditors may nevertheless
withhold consent to a sensible plan of adjustment in an effort to
capture a greater share than that to which they would otherwise be
entitled. The principal sponsor of the first municipal-bankruptcy
legislation had just this dynamic in mind: “In every instance where a
governmental unit finds itself in financial difficulty and is able to
make some satisfactory agreement of adjustment with the majority of
its creditors, there is always a small minority who hold out and
146
demand preferential treatment.” The 1933 amendments sought to
overcome holdout by permitting a federal judge to approve a
147
settlement acquiesced to by a supermajority of creditors.
The Supreme Court promptly held the amendments
unconstitutional, on the puzzling theory that the federal government’s
148
grant of an option to discharge debts intruded on state sovereignty.
(Bankruptcy was purely optional because involuntary petitions of the
type familiar to individual and corporate bankruptcy were
149
forbidden. ) Congress enacted substantially identical legislation in
1937, and after the famous “switch in time” the Court upheld the new

144. Unlike state legislatures, Congress may impair the obligation of contracts under its
authority “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902)
(holding that the Bankruptcy Clause empowers Congress “to discharge the debtor from his
contracts and legal liabilities”).
145. See generally, e.g., Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502
(1942); Randall S. Kroszner, Is It Better to Forgive Than to Receive? An Empirical Analysis of
the Impact of Debt Repudiation (Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 481, 2003).
146. To Amend the Bankruptcy Act: Municipal and Private Corporations: Hearings on H.R.
1670, H.R. 3083, H.R. 4311, H.R. 5009, and H.R. 5267 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
73rd Cong. 22 (1933) (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox).
147. Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 526 (1936)
(“After hearing, the judge shall confirm the plan, if satisfied that it is fair, equitable, for the best
interests of the creditors, does not unduly discriminate, complies with the statute, and has been
accepted by those holding two-thirds of the indebtedness.”).
148. Id. at 531.
149. Id. at 524–25.
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150

bill. Federal law has provided some kind of municipal-bankruptcy
process ever since. The regime in effect today was in large measure
established with the advent of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. Others
have admirably canvassed the significance of Chapter 9’s various
151
provisions; I need not replicate their work here. A few of the details
are, however, important to the questions this Article raises, and it will
be useful to touch on them briefly.
One important set of rules concerns eligibility. Chapter 9 is
152
153
available to “municipalities” only, on a strictly voluntary basis. A
municipality seeking relief must be empowered to do so by state law,
must be insolvent, and before filing a petition must try to reach an
accommodation with creditors unless “such negotiation is
154
impracticable.”
The insolvency requirement is particularly
important. With respect to Chapter 9, the Bankruptcy Code adopts a
cash-flow understanding of insolvency, providing that a municipality
is insolvent only if it is “generally not paying its debts as they become
155
due” or is “unable to pay its debts as they become due.” Some
federal courts have understood this to mean that Chapter 9 is
available only if a municipality will be unable to pay its bills within
the fiscal year (taking borrowing capacity and taxing powers into
156
account). In this way the Bankruptcy Code circumscribes quite
narrowly the domain of municipal bankruptcy, perhaps too
157
narrowly.
It is important to understand something of the law’s reach as well
as its subject. Here again, Chapter 9’s ambition may seem modest. In
a corporate reorganization under Chapter 11, the bankruptcy judge
may if necessary cram down a plan of reorganization with widespread

150. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51–54 (1938).
151. The best scholarly introduction to, and evaluation of, Chapter 9 is still McConnell &
Picker, supra note 12.
152. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1) (2012).
153. Id. § 303(a) (2012) (“An involuntary case may be commenced only under chapter 7 or
11 of this title.”).
154. Id. § 109(c)(2)–(3), (5) (2012).
155. Id. § 101(32)(C) (2012).
156. In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 336–37 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); In re Villages at
Castle Rock Metro. Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. 76, 84 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
157. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 12, at 456–57 (“While the gatekeeper function
reduces the moral hazard of easy debt relief, the insolvency standard almost certainly makes
both creditors and debtor worse off in those cases actually culminating in bankruptcy.”).
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consequences for the debtor enterprise. Chapter 11 plans routinely
contemplate the sale of a significant percentage of assets, the spinoff
of entire business units, or even the total reconstitution of governance
159
through auction.
In Chapter 9 proceedings, by contrast, the
bankruptcy judge may do little more than approve a plan reducing
the municipality’s debts in a manner consistent with the “fair and
160
equitable” standard. The court has no power to decree that a debtor
entity’s assets or taxing power be put to a particular use; it cannot
161
compensate frustrated creditors with the keys to City Hall. Chapter
9 is thus oriented toward a singular function—the elimination of debt
overhang.
The first proposals for a state-bankruptcy law were premised on
this model. Consistent with the origins of municipal bankruptcy,
162
proponents noted the potential of legislation to cure debt overhang.
But their bête noir was a different animal: the moral hazard of risk
163
externalization. Advocates of a state-bankruptcy procedure take the
view that the existence of an orderly process for adjusting state debts,
a process with the patina of law, could weaken the political argument
in favor of federal assistance. As one commentator put it, “The
appeal of bankruptcy-for-states is that it would give the federal
164
government a compelling reason to resist the bailout urge.” This, in
turn, could ameliorate states’ moral hazard by forcing them and their
creditors jointly to internalize the risks of bad fiscal conditions. The
proposed law would mirror Chapter 9 in important respects. To avoid
158. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012) (setting out conditions on satisfaction of which a plan “shall”
be confirmed). A cramdown refers to a plan confirmed over the objection of at least one class of
creditors.
159. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Reply, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56
STAN. L. REV. 673, 675–85 (2003).
160. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012) (incorporating relevant portions of 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012)).
161. Id. § 904 (2012) (“Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consents
or the plan so provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in the case or
otherwise, interfere with—(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor; (2) any
of the property or revenues of the debtor; or (3) the debtor’s use or enjoyment of any incomeproducing property.”). Notwithstanding this literal reservation of power, commentators have
noted that a bankruptcy judge could push for changes to governance structure by refusing to
confirm any plan that did not “consent” to favored changes. E.g., Gillette, Fiscal Federalism,
supra note 10, at 293–95 (“[T]he apparently clear rule that the court may not require resource
adjustments becomes more opaque once one considers the discretion that a court does have to
condition the grant of relief in Chapter 9 on the political will of residents to accept them.”).
162. Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note 10, at 687–88.
163. Feibelman, supra note 143, at 93; Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note 10, at 691;
Triantis, supra note 44, at 238.
164. Skeel, Give States, supra note 9, at 3.
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constitutional doubt, resort to the procedure would need to be
voluntary. The bankruptcy judge would be empowered to impose a
plan of adjustment on holdout creditors, but would have few other
powers (again out of concern for state sovereignty). The process
would also allow states to reject and renegotiate onerous executory
contracts, in particular labor deals that were the product of collective
165
bargaining.
Academic reception of proposed state-bankruptcy procedures
has been as mixed as the political response. Skeptical commentators
have lodged two general objections: first, that the particular moral
hazard is simply not a significant determinant of state financing
166
policy; and second, that for structural and constitutional reasons
167
bankruptcy is ill-suited to the task of reforming state behavior. At
least one pair of commentators has charged that state bankruptcy
would in practice be used as a Republican tool to punish labor
168
unfairly. Others have considered the general idea of a restructuring
mechanism sound, but have quibbled over the design. Could states
strategically invoke the prospect of bankruptcy to achieve even better
169
bailout terms? Perhaps it would be better to enact a “minimalist”
adjustment mechanism limited to ratifying haircuts agreed to by a
170
supermajority of creditors, or to supply states with a menu of
171
choices. My purpose here is not to critique each conceivable

165. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012) (“Except as provided . . . the trustee, subject to the court’s
approval, may assume or reject any executory contract . . . .”). Chapter 11’s restrictions on the
modification of collective-bargaining contracts do not apply in Chapter 9. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a); In
re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 76 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009).
166. See Levitin, supra note 3, at 221 (“There is a vast literature on the political economy of
budget deficits. Although it identifies many political economy factors that may contribute to
deficits, it has identified political agency problems as a particular cause, as politicians seeking
private benefits and subject to limited electoral discipline run up state spending without
corresponding revenue increases.”); Silvers, supra note 3, at 56 (“[F]ederal-state transfers
necessary to keep states economically healthy are relatively small amounts compared to the aid
given to the financial system or the tax breaks offered or renewed at a federal level since 2007.
It is not an issue of money; it is an issue of political honesty and political will—the honesty to
admit that states are not really fiscally independent of the federal government and the will to act
responsibly in accordance with that reality.”).
167. Gelpern, supra note 10, at 1113; Levitin, supra note 3, at 214–15; Schragger, supra note
25, at 881–82.
168. Catherine Fisk & Brian Olney, Labor and the States’ Fiscal Problems, in WHEN STATES
GO BROKE, supra note 3, at 253, 293. For a more thorough explication of the prevailing
critiques of state-bankruptcy proposals, see generally Skeel, Is Bankruptcy, supra note 10.
169. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 10, at 328.
170. Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 331.
171. Triantis, supra note 44, at 242 n.11.
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permutation of federal legislation. This excursion is rather meant to
establish two points about the state-bankruptcy debate. First, whether
they support or oppose a formal debt-adjustment process, scholars
almost unanimously assume that some kind of congressional action
172
would be needed to achieve it. Second, the starting place for the
debate has been Chapter 9.
B. State Eligibility for Chapter 9 Absent Legislation
Undoubtedly, states are formally ineligible for bankruptcy relief.
The Bankruptcy Code permits only a “municipality” to be a debtor
173
under Chapter 9, and that term is defined as a “political subdivision
174
The states
or public agency or instrumentality of a State.”
themselves are excluded by implication. Congressional amendment
would be necessary to bring a state qua state within the Bankruptcy
Code’s ambit.
In functional terms, though, the states are free to structure their
debts so as to fit the Bankruptcy Code’s capacious definition of a
“municipality.” Suppose that Illinois wished to become Chapter 9–
eligible. It could charter an instrumentality—call it Schmillinois—for
the sole purpose of issuing the state’s debt. Schmillinois would issue
general-obligation bonds; it would promise to back state employees’
pension rights; it would cut checks to the state’s trade creditors. In
short, Schmillinois would act as the state’s financing arm, funded
presumably through annual appropriations. Yet it would not be the
state. It would have none of the sovereignty vested in the state by the
Constitution, and it would exist firmly under the state’s dominion. In
form, Schmillinois would resemble the many other instrumentalities
and agencies with authority to act within the state, without regard to
the geographical boundaries associated with towns and cities.
There is no reason to think a special-purpose instrumentality of
this kind would not qualify as a “municipality.” Courts interpreting
the term’s meaning for eligibility purposes have looked to a variety of
factors. They have considered, for example, the extent to which a
would-be petitioner engages in traditional governmental functions;
the extent to which the putative municipality is subject to state rather
than private control; and, perhaps most importantly, whether the
172. Id. at 240–41; McConnell & Picker, supra note 12, at 229; Levitin, supra note 3, at 214–
16. But see Hynes, supra note 10, at 698 (arguing that composition under state law is sufficient).
173. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1) (2012).
174. Id. § 101(40).
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state itself categorizes the entity as a municipality or
175
instrumentality. Schmillinois would seem to withstand scrutiny quite
176
easily.
Chapter 9’s availability to states as a debt-adjustment mechanism
suggests that the question scholars have been debating—namely,
whether
Congress
should
enact
state-bankruptcy-enabling
legislation—should be restated. The question is rather why states
have not availed themselves of the power they already have to make
their debt adjustment-eligible. This section explores possible
explanations that suggest a skeptical point of view not only about
“Chapter 9 for states,” but indeed about the utility of virtually any
restructuring mechanism that turns on state consent.
The most obvious explanation of the states’ continued Chapter 9
ineligibility is that state leaders have not thought eligibility possible.
To be sure, this Article marks, as far as I am aware, the first
suggestion that states can effectively opt into Chapter 9 eligibility.
177
The existing literature is to the contrary, and explicitly so. In
general, it is precisely states’ assumed ineligibility that has motivated
proposals for federal legislation in the first place. But failure of
imagination is not an altogether satisfying explanation. State
policymakers have long used instrumentalities and special-purpose
districts to carry out state capital projects and operations.
Instrumentalities are often used to impose state-level policies in the
face of local opposition; at other times they are used to incur debt for
state-desired projects otherwise frustrated by balanced-budget
178
amendments and other restrictions on indebtedness. And these
instrumentalities are not always geographically defined—consider, for
175. See In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 795 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).
176. Eligibility litigation to date has turned on whether an entity should be classified as a
municipality (in which case Chapter 9 is appropriate), or as a business firm (which must petition
under Chapters 7 or 11, but not 9). Courts have not been asked to decide whether a would-be
petitioner is a state. But for the reasons I give, it is hard to see how an entity with powers limited
by charter could be confused with a sovereign state.
177. Levitin, supra note 3, at 214–16; McConnell & Picker, supra note 12, at 229; Schwarcz,
supra note 10 at 326; Triantis, supra note 44, at 240–41. Richard Hynes has documented how
states may, and perhaps already do, take advantage of Chapter 9 by moving obligations from
the state ledger to the balance sheets of various state-administered instrumentalities. See Hynes,
supra note 10, at 683–90. In some respects the structure I suggest is quite similar to this
“synthetic” bankruptcy: both models turn on the juridical difference between a sovereign and its
instrumentalities. Yet the model here suggested would effectively allow for the adjustment of
the entirety of a state’s capital structure.
178. See Roin, supra note 64, at 1978–80 (explaining this phenomenon and offering an
example from the Seattle Mariners’ baseball stadium).
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example, state university systems. In the history of municipal
bankruptcy, the vast majority of petitions have been filed on behalf of
179
these quasi-state entities rather than traditional towns and cities.
Given the prevalence of instrumentalities in state operations and
particularly in the world of municipal bankruptcy, it is rather hard to
believe that no one has considered going whole hog.
Another possibility is that state policymakers simply regard
Chapter 9 as ineffectual and hence not worth the (modest)
transaction costs that becoming eligible would entail. This
explanation has some bite at first glance. Scholars and practitioners
alike have shrugged at the limited benefits of municipal bankruptcy
since its most recent incarnation in 1979. Chapter 9’s requirement
that a municipality be insolvent before seeking protection is a
particularly counterproductive hurdle. It is unclear what it means for
a municipality to be “unable” to pay debts becoming due within the
fiscal year. A weak version of “inability” would describe something
like the political infeasibility of raising sufficient revenue to pay
creditors in light of, for example, necessary operational expenses and
the reality of voter preferences. On this view bankruptcy judges might
defer in some measure to the representations of elected officials, who
presumably are best situated to describe the conditions of the
electorate. But a stronger version would look to the theoretical power
of a jurisdiction to meet the year’s obligations, whether by further
tapping the credit markets or through a combination of tax increases
and spending reductions. At some point, marginal tax increases and
spending cuts will reduce a jurisdiction’s total revenue. But the
180
precise definition of a jurisdiction’s Laffer curve is anyone’s guess;
and to the extent a municipality bears the burden of persuasion on
this score, the insolvency requirement can dramatically reduce
181
Chapter 9’s usefulness. Financial distress is often a problem long
before a municipal debtor cannot pay in the strong sense. By that
point, it may be a story of too little, too late.
179. Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27
YALE J. ON REG. 351, 359 n.43, 360–61 (2010) (describing Chapter 9 as “used by tiny
municipalities under peculiar circumstances”).
180. The Laffer curve illustrates the idea that tax rates affect productivity. See Jude
Wanniski, Taxes, Revenues, and the “Laffer Curve,” 50 PUB. INT. 3, 3–7 (Winter 1978). At a tax
rate of 0 percent, the government collects no revenue. At a rate of 100 percent, it similarly
collects very little, because those subject to taxation lack incentive to produce (and indeed they
may spend resources trying to evade taxation). The maximum revenue a government can collect
in tax will lie at some unknown intermediate rate.
181. McConnell & Picker, supra note 12, at 456.
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The relatively narrow powers of the bankruptcy judge in Chapter
9 may also limit its usefulness. As mentioned above, the bankruptcy
court has no power to restructure a debtor municipality along the
182
lines of Chapter 11. The bankruptcy judge cannot order changes to
the municipality’s geographical boundaries or to its governance
183
structures.
Nor can she decree tax increases or spending
184
reductions. Some have argued that a forum in which adjustments to
taxing and spending rates are on the table would be preferable to the
185
present regime.
Yet ultimately the limited scope of Chapter 9 cannot explain
states’ perceived ineligibility. Whether amendments could make
Chapter 9 more valuable is an important issue, but at this point a
secondary one. A state could become bankruptcy-eligible for the cost
of repairing a few dozen potholes. And Chapter 9 does seem to
provide some net value in the municipal context. Many states think
186
so, anyway. Otherwise they would withhold permission for their
municipalities to seek relief.
A better explanation lies in the very moral hazard that has
motivated calls for state-bankruptcy legislation. Disinterested
observers may rue the threat of contagion on either efficiency or
distributive grounds. They may see it as a distorting influence on state
financial policy or as an unjustified affront to proper federal–state
relations. From the perspective of a too-big-to-fail state, though,
things look quite different. The threat of contagion turns the federal
government into a (partial) guarantor of state debt, which reduces the
cost of borrowing. Being contagious, then, is valuable. Any
mechanism that reduces the possibility of a bailout is bad in the
state’s eyes for the same reason the general polity approves it. If state

182. See supra text accompanying notes 159–62.
183. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012) (prohibiting judicial “interfere[nce]” with, among other things,
“any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor”).
184. Id.
185. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 10, at 284–86.
186. The states as a whole are mixed on this. See Kenneth E. Noble & Kevin M. Baum,
Municipal Bankruptcies: An Overview and Recent History of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code,
ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL (July 23, 2013), available at http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=c47c30f7-e91f-4398-82f3-f0ce5d2ef704 (“Twelve states specifically authorize
chapter 9 filings, while 12 others permit bankruptcy filings given a further action to be taken by
a state, official or other entity. In addition, three other states authorize a limited subset of
municipalities to file for bankruptcy. The remaining 23 states do not authorize municipal
bankruptcy filings.”).
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bankruptcy can be expected to reduce states’ incentive to seek federal
bailouts, why would a state opt in voluntarily?
The primary virtue of Chapter 9, such as it is, lies in its capacity
to eliminate debt overhang by reducing a distressed municipality’s
187
liabilities over the objection of holdout creditors. If its debt burden
becomes too great, a city may be unable to raise revenue even for
capital expenditures and operations that a vast majority of residents
would be inclined to pay for. The residents, knowing that a large
fraction of each marginal dollar paid into the communal chest is
destined for creditors’ pockets, will tend to lobby for minimal taxes
and fees. Adjusting debts may be the best solution for the city’s
residents and creditors alike, and Chapter 9 provides a mechanism
through which to accomplish this objective.
Yet to judge the potential appeal of Chapter 9 to a state, one
must first reflect on the state’s own power to address debt overhang
and related problems without a bankruptcy process. Without
bankruptcy, as previously discussed, state political actors enjoy an
188
effectively unilateral power to restructure debt ad hoc. Indeed,
under settled doctrine a Chapter 9 proceeding would constrain rather
than enhance state politicians’ discretion. One implication of state
sovereign immunity, and the states’ corresponding ability to
restructure debt through default, is that debt overhang is a red
herring. When a firm’s or an individual’s debt burden is too great, the
existence of the debt may preclude otherwise efficient junior and
equal-priority investment. For the business firm, this means difficulty
raising equity financing or unsecured credit. For an individual, debt
overhang may, for example, discourage labor or investment in human
capital. In theory, debt overhang could have the same effect on a
political entity. But because states can eradicate debt overhang
through default, it is hard to see why they need to invoke a
189
bankruptcy process, the aim of which is to relieve this very problem.
The upshot is that state actors might lack interest in Chapter 9
because they realize that they can achieve its greatest promise—
187. The common-pool problem is of limited significance to a municipality. Under
longstanding doctrine, creditors have minimal ability to foreclose on municipal assets and so to
destroy going-concern value. For a thorough explanation, see McConnell & Picker, supra note
12, at 430–33.
188. This unilateral power represents a significant moral hazard that increases the states’
cost of borrowing, all else being equal. For discussion of overcoming the moral hazard, see supra
text accompanying note 148.
189. Others have made this general point. Gelpern, supra note 12, at 894.
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reduction of debt overhang—through unilateral action. In Chapter 9,
a state would need to appeal to a bankruptcy judge’s discretion in
cramming down a plan of adjustment (assuming at least one
190
dissenting class of creditors). Outside bankruptcy, the federal
imprimatur is unnecessary.
In talking this way I hope to avoid falling into a composition
fallacy. With apologies to Professor Kenneth Shepsle for borrowing
191
his classic phrase, a state is a “they,” not an “it.” Not everyone with
political influence in the statehouse benefits from moral hazard.
Those who seek stability, or who have less to gain from marginal
spending or marginal tax relief, for example, could be expected to
lobby for measures reducing moral hazard. If public choice has taught
us anything, it is the unpredictable and often unstable nature of
political accommodation. Yet it is still useful to think about the
incentives of a “state,” just as it is valuable to think about the
incentives of a business firm. Horse-trading among constituencies, as
among corporate stakeholders, tends to move collective policy along
the path of least resistance. In the case of a potentially contagious
state, that path is the one which increases rather than decreases the
likelihood of federal assistance.
These considerations help explain more than just states’ failure
to make themselves eligible for Chapter 9. They also suggest why
nearly any ex post federal restructuring measure is doomed to fail if it
192
requires state consent. State political actors will prefer to set their
own terms of restructuring, through default, and to threaten disorder,
190. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012) (incorporating the requirements to cram down found in
Chapter 11 corporate reorganizations, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)).
191. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent
as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1992).
192. Existing proposals for a state-bankruptcy statute uniformly presume that a law under
which creditors could force states into court involuntarily would be unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Bush & Gingrich, supra note 9 (“[N]either the federal government nor state creditors could
push an unwilling state into bankruptcy, no matter how catastrophic the state’s finances may be,
as this would violate the U.S. Constitution’s protection for a state’s sovereign immunity.”). It is
worth noting that, as a matter of existing doctrine, this is far from clear. In Central Virginia
Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006), the Supreme Court held that Congress may
abrogate state sovereign immunity via its power to make “uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 359
(2006). Katz concerned the power of a bankruptcy court to order relief against a state as the
recipient of a preferential transfer; it did not speak directly of the power to authorize
involuntary petitions. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012). But the Court’s rationale suggests that Congress
could abrogate immunity as it sees fit in the bankruptcy context. See Gelpern, supra note 12, at
899 n.29. Still, the meaning of Katz is largely academic, since even if involuntary bankruptcy for
the states would be constitutional, it is politically infeasible.
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rather than capitulate to the jurisdiction of a federal bankruptcy
judge.
C. Tax-Credit Borrowing as a Solution
Tax-credit borrowing furnishes a more effective deterrent. The
optimistic intuition at play is straightforward. The federal
government’s incentive to bail out is related to the risk of possible
spillover effects and contagion associated with a disorderly state
default. Sudden, unexpected shortfalls can send shockwaves through
the entire associated economy. But tax-credit bonds preclude default.
Without default, the logic goes, there is less threat of a federal bailout
because there is a less credible threat of contagion. Knowing this ex
ante, the state and its creditors are forced to internalize the risk of
bad fiscal conditions. More precisely, since the debt is risk-free, the
state’s “residual claimants”—its residents, its voters—are forced to
internalize the risk of financial distress. This in turn should lead to
lower levels of borrowing.
Of course, contagion is not the only reason the federal
government may be inclined to assist distressed states, and it remains
possible that federal assistance of other kinds may simply replace the
dreaded bailout. A significant part of state money already comes in
the form of grants-in-aid not tied to creditor recoveries. Put
succinctly, the question is whether the federal government will simply
replace one form of assistance with another. In some limited sense the
answer must be that it will. Already some federal grants are
predicated on the states’ relative financial health. Medicaid, for
example, ties the share of federal matching funds to the average
193
income of a state’s residents. Because a state’s financial problems
tend to reduce that average income, they simultaneously increase the
federal government’s generosity. One could see this kind of assistance
as an analogue to federal flood insurance, for example. This is the
pathetic appeal to help fellow citizens who face hard times without
“fault.” Yet spillover effects surely matter, in addition to the fellow
feeling that defines national identity. And to the degree that
externalities in this context are a function, in part, of the disorder and
uncertainty of default, a default-proof borrowing mechanism should
reduce the federal tendency to intervene even if it cannot hope to
eliminate intervention altogether.
193. Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the Medicaid Program: A Challenge to
Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 860 (1990).
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The feasibility of tax-credit borrowing depends in the first
instance on voluntary state action. It is the state that must choose to
finance with tax offsets. This presents a puzzle. If one of the principal
effects of a tax-credit borrowing regime is to reduce the states’ ability
to externalize risk by credibly threatening default, why would a state
willingly play along? The same logic that undermines voluntary debtadjustment proposals would seem to cast the same shadow on taxcredit borrowing.
In some measure, federal legislative action is probably needed to
spur tax-credit borrowing. At minimum, as noted earlier, the Tax
Code would need to be amended to undo what is in effect a subsidy of
194
traditional bond borrowing. But indeed, parity is likely not enough.
A relative subsidy of tax-credit borrowing would likely be necessary
to overcome states’ natural interest in risk externalization. If it
becomes cheaper to borrow with tax credits than with traditional
indebtedness, then state decisionmakers must weigh beforehand the
value of cheaper debt against the expected value of risk
195
externalization. What the exact size of the relative subsidy must be
is, of course, a difficult empirical question. Quite apart from the will
of policymakers, the expected liquidity of secondary markets in these
new instruments would affect investors’ appetite to buy tax-credit
bonds offering after-tax yields equal to those of traditional bonds.
Some amount of experimentation would be needed; and indeed, one
of the virtues of introducing tax-credit borrowing would be its
potential to tell us something about the degree of risk externalization
that is actually at play in the political economies of the states. It is
enough here to suggest that relatively small changes in federal tax
policy could do much to encourage tax-credit borrowing.
IV. TAX-CREDIT BORROWING AND AGENCY PROBLEMS
Now suppose that risk externalization is not a significant driver
of state borrowing patterns. Perhaps states borrow the “right”
amount. To the extent they overborrow (relative to their alternative
opportunities to increase tax revenue or decrease spending), the
196
reason is a standard agency problem. Those affected by a state’s
194. See supra text accompanying note 112.
195. Because the relative subsidy would be a matter of public knowledge, it should have
little if any redistributive effect among the states. Depending on the particulars, it could either
increase or decrease the total amount of state borrowing.
196. See supra Part II.B.
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economic activity imperfectly monitor politicians, who find it in their
self-interest to finance current expenditures with debt. If this is the
best way to think about excessive state debt, what are the implications
of a tax-credit borrowing regime? This turns out to be a complex
question dependent on a number of assumptions about state political
economy. I cannot venture a comprehensive analysis here, but it will
be useful to sketch the beginnings of what one might look like.
Tax-credit borrowing could affect state fiscal policy in two
respects. First, and most obviously, the power to issue risk-free debt
could reduce a state’s borrowing costs by eliminating the default
197
premiums creditors inevitably charge. At first blush, this would
seem to imply more debt. The cheaper a good, the more one expects
to see consumed. But the effect is not altogether clear in this case,
because issuing risk-free debt also has implications for the monitoring
of political actors. A creditor bearing the risk of default has an
incentive to lobby or otherwise push for fiscal policies that will ensure
future solvency. A creditor holding risk-free debt has no such
incentive. The intuition can be put more generally. To the extent a
state borrows against future tax credits, it shifts the incidence of
financial ruin (and therefore the monitoring incentive) from creditors
198
to “residual” constituencies, in particular residents and voters.
A shift toward tax-credit borrowing need not be wholesale.
States could issue tax-credit debt to some but not other classes of
creditors. To illustrate, suppose there are two kinds of creditors, X
and Y, and an undifferentiated public, P. In a traditional borrowing
regime, all three actors have some incentive to monitor fiscal policies,
but the incentive for each is curbed by the free-rider effect. If the
state begins to borrow with tax credits only, the monitoring incentive
is placed squarely on P. If the state adopts a mixed strategy,
borrowing from X with tax credits and from Y with traditional
promises to pay, then the monitoring incentive shifts to Y and P. If an
agency problem is the cause of excessive state debt, then placing the
monitoring incentive with the best-situated constituency or
constituencies could lessen the problem and reduce overall financing
costs. Now suppose that X and Y correspond to dispersed foreign
bondholders
and
union-represented
domestic
employees,
respectively. Between the two of them, the public employees would
197. See supra text accompanying notes 27–30.
198. Even more particularly, the cost of imprudent fiscal decisions falls on the owners of real
property and other immovable assets.
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seem to be the better monitors. Their coalition is stable and
organized, and they wield voting power. If this is right, then a state
might rationalize its fiscal policies by issuing tax-credit bonds coupled
with traditional pension promises.
This example is meant only to be illustrative. It is not
immediately obvious which creditor class or classes are best situated
to monitor state debt, or whether any are better situated than the
undifferentiated public. It is a difficult question because monitoring in
this context requires both incentive and political power. A single
foreign creditor holding, say, a billion dollars of state debt has a
strong monitoring incentive, but is relatively impotent; he lacks the
kind of recourse that secured creditors typically enjoy in the private
debt markets. Dispersed voters have relatively little monitoring
incentive, but collectively they may have the most power to discipline
political actors. In the municipal context, two recent articles have
argued that bondholders are better monitors than residents and
199
therefore should bear default risk. This may or may not be right.
The argument focuses on monitoring incentives but ignores the
efficacy of monitors’ tools. A rigorous monitoring analysis would
need to consider both incentives and power, and would need to take
into account the wide variety of constituent classes. Bondholders and
voters are but two of many.
One appealing attribute of tax-credit borrowing is its capacity to
solve this dilemma, if only imperfectly, by allowing classes of creditors
to sort themselves through trade. Suppose a state wishes to raise $100
through borrowing, and that it elects to do so by issuing $50 of
tradable tax credits and $50 of traditional debt. The tax-credit
borrowing will offer a lower yield, to be sure, but one could conclude
that rational creditors will be indifferent as between the investments
because the default premium should be expected to equal the
200
likelihood of a default times the expected loss in case of default.
Nevertheless, this presumed indifference does not hold if lenders
perceive themselves as having varying degrees of political influence.
The lender who believes himself relatively powerless, for whatever
199. See Gillette, supra note 25, at 654–76; Richard C. Schragger, Citizens Versus
Bondholders, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 789–93 (2012).
200. See Modigliani & Miller, supra note 29, at 288 (“[T]he cut-off point for investment . . .
will be completely unaffected by the type of security used . . . . [W]e may say that regardless of
the financing used, the marginal cost of capital to a firm is equal to the average cost of capital,
which is in turn equal to the capitalization rate for an unlevered stream in the class to which the
firm belongs.”).
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reason, will be inclined to buy tax-credit bonds. On the other hand,
the lender who believes herself to be relatively effective at influencing
fiscal policy will choose the higher yield—traditional debt—on the
theory that, with her influence, the yield implies an overstated
expected cost of default. Put differently, those lenders who believe
they have a relative monitoring advantage will prefer traditional debt
precisely because they think they can reduce the likelihood of default
relative to what one expects in a world where states issue traditional
debt only.
CONCLUSION
This Article has introduced tax-credit borrowing as a solution to
one increasingly important problem of state finance: the moral hazard
associated with credible threats of contagion. Widespread use of a
risk-free form of debt should indeed reduce the federal government’s
incentive to intervene with assistance aimed at preventing the
disorder and the uncertain chain reaction associated with default. To
be sure, tax-credit borrowing could prove itself a kind of Maginot
Line: advantage being the mother of invention, states might find
other, less obvious means of externalizing risk. But in any event, the
considerations this Article has outlined suggest that an ex ante
financing solution would be more effective than ex post restructuring
initiatives that depend on state consent, which in this context looks
very much like unilateral disarmament.
Yet tax-credit borrowing may ultimately find its most valuable
application in other domains. For those who doubt that risk
externalization plays a significant role in excessive state debt (or even
doubt that states systematically overborrow), the selective use of riskfree debt augurs very different prospects. An enlightened political
class could, for example, use superpriorities to reduce the cost of
borrowing from politically weak persons or classes. By placing the
incidence of default on politically powerful coalitions, tax-credit
borrowing could more broadly help to rationalize state finance. Or
venal politicians might use superpriority borrowing to insulate
favored constituencies and inefficiently reduce their monitoring
incentives. How these dynamics would likely play out is a difficult
question of political economy, and this Article has sought only to
gesture in its direction. What this Article has shown, I hope, is that
tax-credit borrowing offers policymakers and investors alike a chance
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at greater certainty in a world where sovereign immunity still looms
large.

